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The lack of compliance amongst employers with minimum wage legislation is a problem faced by 
many developing countries. South Africa is no exception, informal evidence suggesting that a 
large proportion of the employed in the country earn wages below the stipulated minima. This 
dissertation attempts to measure non-compliance or, in other words, ‘violation’ of employers in 
South Africa of minimum wage legislation, and to investigate the determinants of this violation. 
This study constitutes the first attempt to measure enforcement and compliance in South Africa. 
In order to measure the strength of government enforcement of minimum wages in South 
Africa, the number of labour inspectors is used as a proxy measure, while employer non-
compliance, or violation, is measured using an approach developed by Kanbur (2007), referred to 
here as the ‘Kanbur Index of Violation’. Derived from the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (1984) poverty 
measures, this index is used to measure the share of violated workers receiving sub-minimum 
wages, as well as the depth of violation, namely, the average gap between the stipulated minima 
and the actual wage paid.  This is the first attempt in the literature on minimum wage 
enforcement to use the methodology proposed by Kanbur (2007) for the measurement of 
violation. The estimates obtained for South Africa show that the sectors where violation is most 
prevalent include the Security, Taxi and Farming sectors. A multivariate analysis is employed, 
using standard OLS, probit, and quantile regression techniques to investigate the determinants of 
the probability of a worker being violated by their non-compliant employer, as well as of the 
depth and extent of the violation, that is, the shortfall of their wage from the minimum. Another 
innovation of this paper, in addition to the use of the Kanbur index as a measure of violation, is 
the introduction of a number of spatial/density variables, such as the log of workers per square 
kilometre, the density of labour inspectors in a District Council, and the unemployment density 
in the area. The construction of these variables was made possible by mapping the statutory 
minima, which are location specific, to the geographic units in the Labour Force Survey data for 













variables, including individual, firm-level/contractual, sectoral, as well as spatial/density 
characteristics. A key marker of the probability of minimum wage violation and the depth of 
violation is the density of labour inspectors in the District Council where the worker is 
employed. Firm-specific characteristics such as firm size also play a leading role. The results from 
this dissertation carry important policy implications for minimum wage legislators in South 



































Developing countries are notorious for poor labour market conditions (Ronconi, 2008). While 
most developing countries have extensive labour regulations and social security systems, 
compliance with legislation in these countries is generally low (Ronconi, 2008; Strobl & Walsh, 
2003). A key problem affecting wage earners in developing countries is the issue of law 
enforcement, particularly the enforcement of legislation pertaining to minimum wages. There is a 
burgeoning literature on the problem of non-compliance amongst employers with minimum 
wage laws in developing countries (Basu, Chau & Kanbur, 2007; Andalón & Pagés, 2008). 
According to Kanbur (2007), non-compliance by employers can be considered as a violation of 
minimum wage legislation by employers. The measurement of non-compliance, or in other 
words, violation, however, remains elusive. One way in which non-compliance can be measured 
is as the fraction of all workers covered by minimum wage legislation whose wages are below the 
minimum (Kanbur, 2007). However, this approach is not an accurate measure of non-
compliance since it cannot distinguish between different levels of non-compliance. For instance, 
a wage just below the minimum is counted the same as a wage at one third of the minimum-
surely an inexact way to measure a violation of regulation. Given this drawback, this dissertation 
uses a methodology developed by Kanbur (2007), which proposes an ‘index of violation’ based on 
the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke (1984) poverty measures as a measure of both the level and extent 
of violation of minimum wages in South Africa. The strength of enforcement is measured by the 
density of labour inspectors in a location. This is the first exercise attempting to measure non-
compliance and enforcement in South Africa, and to quantify the relationship between 
enforcement and non-compliance.  Another innovation in this paper is the matching of the 
sectoral and occupational minima to their respective locations. In South Africa, minimum wages 
are issued specific to sector, occupation, and location. However, until now, the locational units 
available in the Labour Force Survey data for South Africa had not been mapped to the local 













attempt to control for the spatial uniqueness of sectoral minima in South Africa by mapping 
individual wage earners to their specific locational minima.  
Overall, this dissertation contributes to the literature on enforcement of minimum wages in 
developing countries and the issue of non-compliance with minimum wage regulations in two 
main ways. Firstly, a new methodology is employed in the measurement of non-compliance in 
South Africa, namely Kanbur’s index of violation (Kanbur, 2007). Secondly, it constitutes the 
first endeavour to measure the level, depth and extent of violation of minimum wages by 
employers in South Africa, and to empirically investigate the determinants of this violation.  
The rest of the dissertation is structured as follows. Section II below provides a review of 
the existing literature on non-compliance in South Africa and other countries. Section III 
attempts to describe the methodology surrounding the measurement of non-compliance with 
minimum wage laws. This section presents the index of violation proposed by Kanbur (2007) 
that captures both the number of wage earners below the minimum and how far below the 
minimum their wages fall. The datasets to be used and data issues confronted are also presented 
here, along with the process used to map the area units to the sectoral minima. Section IV 
presents the results from the analysis. Estimates of Kanbur’s index of violation for South Africa’s 
various sectoral wage minima are presented, followed by a multivariate analysis of the key factors 



















II. Literature Review 
Generally speaking, compliance amongst employers with labour regulations in developing 
countries is low, and minimum wage regulations are no exception (Ronconi, 2008; Basu, Chau, 
and Kanbur, 2009). For example, in Argentina, only half the workforce receives legally mandated 
benefits (for instance, wages above the legal minimum, hours worked below the legal maximum, 
compensation for  work related injuries, etc.) (Ronconi, 2008). Minimum wage non-compliance 
rates in Kenya reach a disturbingly high estimate of 67 % in higher skilled occupations in urban 
areas. Studies also find substantial non-compliance in other developing countries such as Brazil 
(Lemos, 2006), Trinidad and Tobago (Strobl and Walsh, 2001) and several Latin American 
countries (Maloney and Nuñez, 2003).  As Ronconi (2008) points out, it is not the lack of labour 
regulations in these countries which is the key issue. Indeed, most developing countries have an 
extensive web of labour regulations. For instance in South Africa, statutory minimum wages vary 
by occupation, sector and location, and consequently there are over 36 different wage minima 
(known as sectoral determinations in South Africa1). Hence, it seems that the key issue here is 
not a lack of legislation but rather a lack of compliance amongst employers, due to imperfect 
enforcement (Basu, Chau, and Kanbur, 2009). Despite the problem of low enforcement of 
minimum wage legislation in developing countries, the issues of enforcement and compliance 
with minimum wage legislation are significantly under researched, both empirically and 
theoretically. In this section, we attempt to take stock of some of the literature on minimum 
wage legislation in developing countries, paying particular attention to studies on South Africa.  
Most of the literature on minimum wages concerns their impact on employment and 
poverty (Stewart, 2004; Card and Krueger, 1995), rather than the measurement of employer 
compliance with minimum wage legislation. There is much debate in the literature regarding the 
equity and efficiency tradeoffs of minimum wage hikes (Basu, Chau, and Kanbur, 2009). The 
concern for equity stems from the effect of an imposed minimum wage on income distribution, 
                                                           
1 A complete listing of the sectoral determinations for South Africa can be found at the website of the Department of 
Labour (DoL). Available from: http://www.labour.gov.za/legislation/sectoral-determinations/sectoral-determination. 













while the efficiency concerns include the impact of a minimum wage on employment. 
Contributing to the equity-efficiency argument, a number of studies investigate the relationship 
between minimum wages and poverty (Saget, 2001; Vedder and Galloway, 2001; Fields and 
Kanbur, 2007; Card and Kreuger, 1995). While the general consensus in the literature is that 
minimum wages have important implications for poverty, the empirical evidence is mixed. 
Results for Latin America show that poverty levels fall as the minimum wage rises since the 
minimum wage may raise the wages of poor wage earners, hence lifting them above the poverty 
line (Andalón and Pagés, 2008). On the other hand, Fields and Kanbur (2007) find that the 
impact of a minimum wage on poverty can be positive, negative, or zero depending on a number 
of factors, such as poverty aversion, the ratio of the minimum wage to the poverty line, income 
sharing, and the elasticity of labour demand.  
As in the literature on the interactions between minimum wages and poverty, the 
evidence on the employment effects of minimum wages is also mixed. For instance, Bhorat 
(2000) showed that minimum wage hikes in South Africa are associated with a decline in 
employment among low-paid Farm and Domestic workers. Maloney and Nuñez (2003) also 
found negative employment effects resulting from minimum wage increases in Columbia. In 
contrast, Lemos (2006) finds no significant effect of minimum wages in Brazil in either formal or 
informal employment. However, the general consensus that does emerge from the literature is 
that when there is imperfect enforcement, that is, both compliant and non-compliant employers 
are present in a labour market, the employment effect of a minimum wage hike may be positive 
or negative (Basu, Chau, and Kanbur, 2009). However, in developing countries, most of the 
evidence suggests a negative employment effect of minimum wages when enforcement is 
imperfect (Andalón and Pagés, 2008). 
There are a number of studies that attempt to study compliance with minimum wages by 













compliance as the fraction of workers who receive wages at the minimum (Andalón and Pagés, 
2008). For instance, Andalón and Pagés (2008) measure the percentage of workers whose 
earnings are at the minimum wage level in Kenya. They find that only a small fraction of salaried 
workers earn wages equal to the statutory minimum. If the fraction is measured as the percentage 
of workers whose wages are within 2% of the statutory minimum, the estimate is only 0.3% for 
workers in agriculture and 2.1% for workers in urban areas. These estimates increase only slightly 
to 6.8% and 2.9% respectively if the range is increased to within 5% of the minimum wage. 
Hence, they conclude there is significant non-compliance with minimum wage legislation in 
Kenya. Their study is interesting in the South African context of more than one minimum wage, 
since in Kenya there are 17 different minimum wage orders, and the minimum wage floors vary 
by sector, occupation, and location. They determine the minimum wage that applies to each 
worker based on sector, occupation, and location. They find that enforcement is higher in non-
agricultural industries, whilst non-compliance is higher among youth, women and the lesser 
educated. They attribute the low levels of enforcement in Kenya to the large number of 
categories of minimum wages which makes it difficult for firms to know them and arguably, for 
the government to enforce them. An interesting innovation in the Andalón and Pagés (2008) 
study is the estimation of the Kaitz index for Kenya, which measures the ratio of the minima set 
relative to the median wage. They show that in the 1998 to 1999 period, there were 18 minima in 
Kenya, which stood at higher than 70 per cent of the median wage in salaried employment, with 
the minimum wages in most sectors significantly exceeding the median wage for unskilled 
occupations.  A notable result from the study is that although minimum wages in Kenya are set 
high relative to the median wage, non-compliance levels in the country are also high. What is 
interesting is that in Kenya, sectors and occupations with a high Kaitz index are also found to 
have a higher percentage of non-compliance (measured as the fraction of wage earners earning 
below the minimum) and vice versa (Andalón and Pagés, 2008). Certainly then, the ratio of the 













possible determinants of non-compliance or violation. The Kaitz index is therefore estimated for 
South Africa later on in this thesis (Section IVa).  
While examining wage distributions and measuring the fraction of workers below the 
minimum wage in a country are both useful in providing initial evidence of compliance levels, 
such methods fail to deliver conclusive evidence about the relationship between enforcement and 
compliance. There is a need for more empirical studies measuring the effects of enforcement on 
compliance.  Ronconi’s (2008) study on Argentina constitutes one of the first attempts to 
empirically estimate the effect of government enforcement on compliance with labour 
regulations in a developing country. Using data for the period from 1995 to 2002, he attempts to 
analyse the effect of enforcement on the extent of compliance using a two stage least squares 
estimation procedure. Ronconi uses the number of labour inspectors working in provincial 
public enforcement agencies as a proxy for enforcement activity. He measured the extent of 
compliance by the percentage of private sector employees receiving legally mandated benefits 
(namely, wages above the legal minimum, hours worked below the legal maximum, legally 
mandated vacations, annual extra monthly salary, coverage against work related injuries, and 
health insurance). The author notes, importantly, that the number of inspectors is only a proxy 
measure for enforcement, since inspector productivity can change over time and across 
provinces (Ronconi, 2008). The study finds that enforcement increases with the number of 
labour inspectors. For instance, the correlation between the number of labour inspectors and the 
number of fines imposed was 0.89 in Argentina between 1996 and 1998. The results from the 
Ronconi study showed that enforcement, as measured by the number of labour inspectors, 
increases the extent of compliance (This measure of enforcement is also employed in the analysis 
later on in this paper for South Africa). Unemployment was found to be negatively correlated 
with compliance levels.  It is worth noting that one of the main differences between Argentina 
and South Africa is that the minimum wage is constant at $200 across all provinces during the 













occupational, or locational variations in minima. However, in attempting to conduct such an 
analysis for South Africa, it becomes necessary to control for the various statutory minima based 
on sector, occupation, and location.  
Turing to South Africa, if the literature on enforcement of minimum wages in developing 
countries is scarce, South Africa is no exception. Since the introduction of the first sectoral 
determination (Contract Cleaners in 19992), there have been a few studies in South Africa that 
have considered the impact of sectoral determinations on specific groups of workers. Among 
these have been Hertz (2005) who analysed the impact of minimum wages on employment and 
earnings of domestic workers in South Africa, and Murray and Van Walbeek (2007) who 
conducted a case study of the KwaZulu Natal North and South Coasts in order to determine the 
impact of the sectoral determinations on farm workers in the sugar industry. There has however 
been very little research on the overall impact of sectoral determinations on workers in South 
Africa. Evidence on the impact of minimum wages and compliance levels in South Africa is 
perhaps limited due to the difficulty of mapping the statutory minima to their respective sectors, 
occupations, and locations.  This thesis constitutes the first attempt to undertake such an analysis 
for South Africa, measuring the level and extent of compliance with sectoral determinations in 
different sectors, as well as the first time that locational variations in the sectoral minima for 
South Africa are controlled for. An overview of sectoral determinations in South Africa and the 
mapping of the respective minima to the sector-occupation-location categories are presented in 
the following section. 
 
 
                                                           
2 Department of Labour (1999) Government Notice No. 622. Sectoral Determination 1: Contract Cleaning Sector, South 
Africa. Available from: http://www.labour.gov.za/legislation/sectoral-determinations/sectoral-determination-1-contract-
cleaning-sector [Accessed September 2009]. 













III. Minimum Wage Violation in South Africa 
Wage formation in the South African labour market proceeds via two main channels, notably 
bargaining councils, and government-mandated wage minima (DoL, 2003). The body responsible 
for issuing state legislation is the Employment Conditions Commission (ECC). The ECC is a 
representative body within the Department of Labour (DoL) established in 1999 in order to 
advise the Minister of Labour on appropriate and feasible sectoral determinations, effectively, 
sectoral wage minima. The broad aim of the ECC is to protect vulnerable workers in the South 
African labour force, that is, sectors in which workers are likely to be exploited, or in which 
worker organizations and trade unions are absent, and workers are not appropriately covered by 
the BCEA or other wage regulating mechanisms (DoL, 2003). Within this context for instance, 
agricultural and domestic workers form two of the most vulnerable groups in the South African 
labour market.  
The DoL uses a team of labour inspectors whose job is to enforce compliance with these 
sectoral determinations. There has been some discussion attributing regional variation in the 
degree of violation of minimum wage laws to differences in the numbers and distribution of 
inspectors within areas, as well as the possibility of the corruption of the inspectorate deployed. 
Scant and poor quality data in the inspectorate however, renders this a difficult set of 
propositions to explain further. 
The ECC sectoral determinations set general conditions for employment such as minimum 
wages, working hours, number of leave days, and termination rules.  There are 11 different 
sectoral determinations set by the ECC, specifically  Forestry, Agriculture, Contract Cleaning, 
Children in the Performance of Advertising, Artistic and Cultural Activities (under fifteen years 
of age), Taxi Operators, Civil Engineering, Learnerships, Private Security, Domestic Workers, 
Wholesale and Retails, and Hospitality3.  
                                                           
3 Detailed descriptions of each of the sectoral determinations are available on the website of the Department of Labour:  













The wage minima in these industries are regularly updated for inflation through a formal 
government gazetting process. Ultimately though, it is important to emphasise that within the 
South African labour market, no unitary national wage minimum exists. The different sectoral 
determinations, minima set, and year of enforcement are shown in Table A1 in the appendix.  
III a:  Sectoral Minima in South Africa  
This section attempts below to provide a brief overview of the Ministry of Labour’s sectoral 
minimum wage laws or, as they are officially known in South Africa, sectoral determinations. In 
total, nine sectoral determinations4 are investigated, utilizing nationally representative labour 
force surveys to analyse and measure compliance levels in the South African labour market. 
Turning to the first of these minima then, the Retail and Wholesale sectoral determination covers 
all those employed in that sector, excluding the self-employed. Within this determination, there 
are six different sub-groups, which could be isolated using the labour force survey data, namely 
managers, clerks, shop assistants, sales assistants, drivers, and fork-lift operators. The minima 
which are set differ for each of these sub-groups depending on the region of employment. In 
most sectoral determinations, the state sets wage minima by location to account principally for 
urban and rural areas. Hence, it is commonplace to stipulate minimum wage levels by urban, 
rural and semi-urban areas.  
Wage stipulations for Domestic Workers are taken to represent domestic workers or 
gardeners in elementary occupations working for private households.  Within this determination, 
there are two area types, A and B.  The prescribed minima are different on the basis of whether 
the number of hours worked is below or above 27 hours per week.  
The Farm Worker sectoral determination applies to all agricultural sector workers, excluding 
workers in the forestry sector (The definition includes security guards working for a farm as 
well). 
                                                           
4 In the analysis that follows below, the sectoral determination covering learnerships was excluded due to a lack of 
information in the LFS pertaining to learners. Naturally, the sectoral determination applicable to children working in 
performance arts was also excluded since children are not classified as being part of the working age population (15 to 65 













The sectoral determination for the Forestry sector sets a fixed minimum rate of 
remuneration for those working in all areas within the forestry sector, with no locational 
differential.  
The sectoral determination for the Taxi sector applies to all categories of workers in the 
transport sector involved in the operation of minibus taxis, and excludes metered taxis. Within 
this determination a distinction is made between drivers and fare collectors.  
The ECC’s sectoral determination for the Private Security sector applies to all employers 
and employees involved in guarding or protecting fixed property, premises, goods, persons or 
employees. We assume that security workers employed in the retail sector fall under the retail 
sectoral determination. Minimum wages are differentiated by the security officers’ grade 
(qualification) and the years of operation. Grades A to E are specified, but these cannot be 
isolated using the labour force data. Thus, for the purposes of this study, the minima for security 
workers were calculated as the average of the minima of the various grade officers was used 
along with the sectoral determinations of the 1st year of operation. There are five different area 
types demarcated within this determination. 
In the wage minima for the Hospitality sector, the only variation in the minimum wage 
comes from the fact that small firms (less than ten employees) face a lower minimum wage than 
medium to large firms.5  
The Contract Cleaning sector was identified as cleaners who work outside of the private 
household sector. The contract cleaning industry is difficult to isolate using the labour force 
survey data, and contract cleaners tend to report a range of industries but the most common 
sector of employment reported is the government, social and other services’ sector. The minima 
prescribed for contract cleaners are hourly minima. These rates were adjusted to derive monthly 
                                                           
5 Respondents in the data report the size of the firm for which they work. This information could be used to identify 













minimum wages for this determination using 45 hours per week as the default. The areas for 
contract cleaners are demarcated into three areas locations6.  
The final sectoral determination is for workers employed in the Civil engineering industry. 
Within the Civil Engineering sector, hourly wages are set on the basis of task grade.  Nine 
different task grades are defined. It was assumed that all workers were engaged in Grade 1 tasks 
(that is, general workers in the Civil Engineering sector) due to a lack of further information in 
the data. Within Grade 1, two different minima are set on the basis of geographical location.  
III b:  Methodological Approach: Kanbur’s Index of Violation 
 In the enforcement literature, non-compliance with minimum wages or ‘violation’ is generally 
measured as the fraction of all covered workers whose wages fall below the statutory minimum. 
However, using this method of measuring compliance one is not able to distinguish between 
different degrees of violation. For example, a wage just below the minimum is equivalent in 
violation to a wage at one-third of the minimum. As a potential solution to the problem, Kanbur 
(2007) proposes what he refers to as an ‘index of violation’ to capture both the number of wage 
earners falling below the minimum as well as the distance of their wages from the minima. This 
method is derived from the generic class of poverty measures introduced by Foster-Greer-
Thorbecke (FGT) (1984)7, namely the headcount index, the poverty gap and the squared poverty 
gap. This approach treats the minimum wage in the same way as the poverty lineZ in the FGT 
poverty measures. By reworking the FGT class of poverty measures, Kanbur (2007) derives both 
an absolute and a relative measure of violation.  It is worth noting, however, that unlike the 
standard FGT index where a fixed poverty line is set for the entire population, in this study each 
                                                           
6 Three areas are specified for the Contract Cleaning sector, namely A, B, and C. Strictly speaking, the published minima do 
not pertain to area B, whose wages are determined by bargaining councils. However, for the sake of discussion we decided 
to include area B workers in our analysis, using the minimum rates for area A as the benchmark.   



















for α≥0 where z is the poverty line, yi is the standard of living indicator of the ith household, and α is the ‘aversion to 
poverty’ parameter. The higher the value ofα , the more sensitive the measure is to the well-being of the poorest person. 
The headcount index is obtained by setting 0=α and the poverty gap by setting 1=α . Setting 2=α gives the squared 













worker covered by minimum wage legislation in South Africa faces a unique minimum 
depending on his or her sector, occupation, location, and hours worked. Using this approach 
then, one can consider the ‘poverty line’Z  for each individual worker as being equal to their 
respective minimum wage.  
The index of violation as proposed by Kanbur (2007) is derived as follows:  
Let the minimum wage for each worker be denoted by . If there is full compliance or, in 
other words, enforcement of the minimum wage is perfect, then, strictly speaking, one would not 
expect to see any wages below  . Compliance of an employer in this context therefore means 
paying a wage  , and non-compliance means paying a wage that is below  .  The measure 
of individual violation or in other words, employer non-compliance, can then be expressed as 
follows: 
    	
                                   0                                                                     (1) 
 The measure of violation of an individual,v , is positive if    (non-compliance), v  is 
equal to zero if    (exact compliance), and v is negative if      (over-compliance) 
(Defined as in Basu, Chan and Kanbur, 2009). The parameter a may take on values greater than 
or equal to zero. When 0=α , v  becomes a marker of violation of an individual, taking on a 
value of 1 when w  is strictly less than , and a value of 0 when w  is greater than or equal 
to . When the parameter    1, v  is the ratio of the gap between the actual wage received by 
the individual,w , and the official minimum , to the minimum .When  1, the value of 
the violation index, v, is more sensitive to larger violations.  
The above equation provides a measure of violation for the wage on an individual. In order 
to obtain a measure of overall violation (Va) in the labour market, the average of individual 

























This expression is simply the equivalent of the familiar FGT poverty measures, with the 
minimum wage  substituting for the poverty line Z and w for income.  In the FGT 
methodology, the parameter  is a measure of poverty aversion (Foster-Greer-Thorebecke, 
1984). Analogously, we can treat  in the above expression as the ‘aversion to violation’ 
parameter. The higher the value of the parameter , the more sensitive the measure is to high 
levels of violation. Setting   equals to 0 provides the proportion of violated individuals, whilst 
  1 denotes the mean shortfall of wages from the minima or, in other words, the average 
depth of violation, and   2  is the squared depth of violation measuring the severity of 
violation (Kanbur, 2007; Foster-Greer-Thorebecke, 1984). 
However, Kanbur (2007) raises an important issue, noting that it is not clear why the whole 
distribution of wage earners should be the denominator in the expression for minimum wage 
violation. If all wages are included in the expression and all wage earners in the denominator, the 
measure of violation is affected by the wages of those individuals who earn above the statutory 
minimum . An alternative measure would consider only those wages that are below  .  If 
this argument is accepted, then for example, when 0=α , the index of violation 
0V becomes the 
number of wage earners below the minimum wage divided by the number of wage earners at or 
below the minimum wage. The universe of relevant wage earners is now only those individuals 
who are now earning wages equal to or below the official minimum . However, Kanbur 
(2007) notes the tendency in the literature using the FGT poverty measures to normalize by the 
entire distribution. Hence, although not ideal, for the sake of consistency with the literature, this 
study uses the entire distribution of wage earners as the basis for normalization in the 
measurement of violation. 
III c: Datasets and Variable Construction 
Labour market data in the post-apartheid period is primarily available from two nationally 













Force Surveys (LFSs)8. The OHSs collected labour market and other data annually for the period 
between 1995 and 1999. The OHS was replaced in 2000 by the LFS, which until 2007 was 
conducted biannually. While desirable, comparisons between the OHSs and LFSs are inadvisable, 
since questions relating to the individual’s employment status changed in the cross-over from the 
OHS to the LFS. Furthermore the LFS provides a far more detailed explanation of what 
constitutes work, and therefore captures irregular and informal work activities more 
comprehensively than the OHS (Casale et al. 2004). In addition, changes within the OHS series 
itself, including methodological improvements, make accurate comparisons between different 
years of OHS data complicated (Casale et al. 2004).  
Given these comparability and compatibility issues, the analysis of enforcement in the South 
African labour market below uses September LFS data from 2001 and 20079, the latter being the 
last September edition of the biannual LFSs. The use of this survey allows us to control for 
survey design in measuring changes over time, since the survey instruments have been largely 
unchanged since the introduction of the survey.  
The Income and Expenditure Survey (IES) 2000 (StatsSA) was also used where appropriate. 
The 1995 IES was a detailed national survey that accompanied the OHS 1995 survey, which 
collected information on income from sources other than employment, combined with a detailed 
profile on expenditure by at least 1000 product categories. This was followed by the 2000 IES. 
The IES samples were drawn on the same sample frame as the LFSs of the same years. The 2000 
IES contains data by magisterial district and this information was used during our mapping of 
local municipalities, magisterial districts, and district councils (DC)10. Furthermore, information 
                                                           
8 From 2008, the LFSs were replaced by Quarterly Labour Force Surveys (QLFSs).  
9 Unfortunately, the QLFS does not contain information on income and hence estimates for 2008 could not be included in 
this analysis.  
10 The demarcation of the boundaries of geographical areas units in South Africa is conducted by the Demarcation Board. 
The Municipal Demarcation Board was established under the Local Government: Municipal Demarcation Act of 1998 in 
order to determine and re-determine municipal boundaries in South Africa. Prior to the elections in 2000, South Africa was 
divided into 843 municipalities (771 local municipal areas, 42 district councils and 6 metropolitan areas with 24 
substructures). After the elections, the number of municipalities was reduced. Currently, South Africa consists of 6 













on the number of covered workers by magisterial district from the 2000 IES was used in order to 
assign DCs to a single area type (A, B or C) in cases where a DC was comprised of local 
municipalities of two or more area types.  
 As noted above, the sectoral minima issued are specific to the location of the workers. 
More In particular though, the DoL has designated the local municipalities to areas A, B, and C 
for the different sectoral determinations. This demarcation was conducted on the basis of the 
average household income recorded for the municipal area concerned in the 1996 census. The 
three areas were as follows:  
A – Average income greater than R24, 000 per annum 
B – Average income between R12, 000 and R24, 000 per annum 
C – Average income less than R12, 000 per annum (DoL, 2005) 
Generally, A areas are urban, B areas are semi-urban, and other areas (C or D) are rural 
areas. The wages in area A are the highest, followed by area B, while area C and other areas have 
the lowest wages. It is important to note that the area designations A, B, and C are inconsistent 
across different sectoral determinations. For example, some local municipalities classified as Area 
A for farm workers fell under Area B in the retail sector.  Hence, the area types were determined 
separately for each sectoral determination 
In the absence of detailed information on area of work in the LFS, it was necessary to 
assume that the area in which the individual resided was the same as where he/she worked. 
However, it is worth emphasizing that the possibility that individuals work outside of the area in 
which they live renders this an imperfect measure.  
In order to assign individuals to area types, it was first necessary to match the geographical 
information available in the LFS 2001 and 2007 to the areas listed under the sectoral 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
municipalities), 46 district municipalities which contain more than one local municipality (Category C municipalities), with 
their contained local municipalities known as Category B municipalities. Within the local municipalities are the magisterial 
districts. There are currently 366 magisterial districts in South Africa (Website of the Municipal Demarcation Board of South 














determinations. The sectoral determinations issued by the ECC list the local municipalities 
comprising each area type. Generally magisterial districts are the smallest area unit contained 
within local municipalities, which are in turn contained within DCs. However, the boundaries of 
these different area units may overlap so that it is not always possible to conclusively assign each 
magisterial district to a single local municipality, and each local municipality to a single district 
council.  
The geographical units used in the various LFSs are not consistent. While the LFS 2000 
contained information by magisterial district, the 2001 LFS provides only province and area type 
(rural/urban). For the 2001 LFS, the magisterial district was derived from the codes in the unique 
number (the first three digits). The magisterial districts were then mapped to local municipalities, 
which were then assigned to areas A, B, C etc. on the basis of the information provided in the 
sectoral determinations. The LFSs from 2004 onwards contain locational information only by 
DCs and not by magisterial districts or local municipalities. For the September 2007 LFS, local 
municipalities were assigned to DCs. This allowed for the DCs to be designated to area A, B, C, 
etc. Our proposed mapping of DCs to areas A, B, etc. for the different sectoral determinations is 
included in the appendix.  
It is worth noting that the mapping presented here should be approached with caution. In 
certain cases assigning a whole DC to a single area A, B or C, was problematic. For instance, in 
some cases a DC contained local municipalities falling under more than one area type. The 
mapping of the cross-frontier municipalities (e.g. Sekhukune, Southern District Municipality 
DC40, Lydenburg, and Mapulaneng), which crossed provincial boundaries, was especially 
difficult for this reason. We attempted to resolve this problem using information from the IES 
2000 on the number of workers covered by ECC legislation in each magisterial district. For 
instance, if certain areas within a DC fell within area A while the others fell within area B, the DC 
was assigned to either area A or B by determining whether there were more people covered by 













Another issue was the adjustment of the published minima to the required time period, as 
well as to account for the number of hours worked by the individual. Using 2000 as the base 
year, the published minimum wages were adjusted to obtain minima for the required year (2001 
and 2007 respectively) using the formula below of the ECC: 
%2
.





          (3) 
where Mtw  is the minimum wage for the period, 
M
tw 1−  is the previous year’s wage and 
.
p is the 
inflation rate based on the CPIX11. Hence, estimates presented in this paper for 2001 have been 
computed using minima in 2001 prices and nominal wages in that year, whilst the 2007 estimates 
have been obtained using  2007 prices (with 2000 as the base year for adjustment of the minima 
in both cases).  
Another issue worth noting is that the monthly minima published by the ECC are all based 
on a 45-hour work week. Workers working longer (or shorter) hours would therefore be paid a 
higher (or lower) wage than the published average. Consequently, the applicable minimum wages 
were adjusted according to the hours worked by each individual. Specifically, we derive an 
adjusted minimum wage ( 	 as the product of the stipulated minimum wage 	 and the 




          (4) 
 
 
                                                           
11 The CPIX used by the ECC is the Consumer Price Index, excluding interest rates on mortgage bonds for metropolitan and 
other urban areas as reported by Statistics SA six weeks before the increases become effective. 
12 The reported ‘hours worked’ variable is truncated at 84 hours to avoid a situation where this adjustment leads to very 


















IV. Results  
This section presents the results of the analysis. First, we provide a descriptive analysis of the 
various measures of violation presented in this study, notably V0, V1, and V2.  Next, a 
multivariate approach is used to investigate the determinants of violation.  
IV a:  Measuring Regulatory Violation-A descriptive Overview 
As a point of departure, a graphical approach is used to investigate the distribution of wages 
around the stipulated minima across the nine sectoral determinations. Below kernel density 
plots13 are presented for 2001 and 2007 of the log of monthly wages for each of the different 
sectoral determinations. The location of the minima for 2001 and 2007 are represented by the 
vertical lines. The mapping in this analysis makes it possible to control for area type (A, B, C, 
etc.) within each sectoral determination.   
Since all of the sectoral determinations were first implemented between 1999 and 2002, 
comparison of the wage distributions of 2001 with 2007 may be used to see whether the 
introduction of the ECC sectoral determinations have had an impact on worker wage 
distributions in South Africa.  If there is enforcement of legal minimum wages in a particular 
sector, one would expect to see the distribution of wages censored from below the level of the 
minimum wage, with none or very few workers earning below the minimum.  
If compliance with minimum wage legislation was high, one would expect the mode of the 
wage distribution – that is, the point where probability distribution function takes its maximum 
value – to lie at the minima. By 2007, this mode should have shifted to the right and closer to the 
minima. A spike at the minimum wage indicates enforcement of minimum wages within that 
sector. In some sectors ‘multiple spikes’ may be observed around the specific minimum wage 
levels within that determination. However, since the minimum wage levels are fairly close 
                                                           
13 The kernel density function approximates the probability density function 	 from observations on a random 



















 where the function , which determines the weights, is named the “kernel,” and   is a smoothing parameter known as 














together and wages are distributed fairly smoothly across the spectrum, these spikes are obscured 
in most of the post-minimum wage distributions (Basu, Chau and Kanbur, 2009; Andalón and 
Pagés, 2008). 
The two vertical lines represent the natural logarithm of the mean adjusted minimum wage 
in 2001(blue) and 2007 (red) respectively. Under full compliance one would expect that the 
wages of all workers covered by the respective sectoral determinations to lie at the vertical line, 
causing a single ‘spike’ at this point in the wage share distribution (Basu, Chau and Kanbur, 2009; 
Andalón and Pagés, 2008). 
The basic visual evidence provided in figure 2 below would seem to suggest that significant 
spiking at the respective minima is not evident for many of the sector-occupation-area cells 
under review here. Put differently, this is initial evidence of relatively weak enforcement of 
sectoral minimum wage laws in South Africa.  
Figure 1: Kernel Density Estimates of wages, 2001 and 2007 
Source: Authors’ calculations using LFS September 2001 and 2007 (StatsSA) and ECC sectoral determinations. 
Notes:  The kernel density estimates of the wages of Forklift Operators in Areas A and B for 2001 are not shown due to 
insufficient sample. The blue line represents the mean minimum wage (logged) in 2001, and the red line the log of the 
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In examining the kernel density plots above, it appears that most of the distributions for 
2001 peak slightly to the left of the normalised minimum wage level. Only the wage distributions 
of the Civil Engineering sector and of Managers in the Retail sector lie significantly to the right 
of the location of the minima in both years, indicating that employees in those sectors generally 
earn above the stipulated minima and are thus better off than their counterparts in other sectors. 
By 2007, some of the distributions appear to have shifted to the right, and closer to the minima, 
suggesting that the sectoral determinations may have had influenced wage levels in these cases. 
This is especially evident in the wage distribution for Domestic workers (all areas), which peaks 
to the left of the minima in 2001 and by 2007 has a spike located to the right of the minima. This 
may point to effective enforcement of sectoral determinations in the Domestic Worker sector 
since 2001, perhaps due to increased targeting of that sector as a vulnerable sector by labour 
inspectors during this time.  
However, while a slight shift to the right is visible in some of the sectors, the sectoral 
determinations do not seem to have had a significant impact on the wage distributions in other 
sectors. The wage distributions of 2001 and 2007 appear to be similar for several sectors, in some 
cases almost overlapping one another (for example, the wage distributions of Retail sector Sales 
Assistants and Clerks). This is preliminary evidence that the ECC sectoral determinations have 
not had a substantial impact on wage distributions in those sectors, possibly an indication of lax 
enforcement in those sectors engendering non-compliance with minimum wage levels.  
As the kernel density estimates of the wage distributions presented above seemed to suggest, 
there is a problem of low enforcement of minimum wages in South Africa, with large 
proportions of workers in some sectors earning sub-minimum wages. We now attempt to use a 
more numerical approach in order to measure the lack of enforcement of minimum wage 
legislation in the South African labour market.  Table 1 therefore presents estimates of Kanbur’s 
index of violation for South Africa based on equations 1 and 2 above, in an attempt at being 













LFS for September 2001 and 2007 then, V0 represents the fraction of individuals earning below 
the minimum, that is, when   0. V1 in turn (when   1) is the wage gap, that is, the gap 
between the actual wage and the official minimum wage, as a fraction of the minimum wage. V1, 
as noted above, provides a measure of how far below the minima an individual earns, and is a 
measure of the extent and depth of violation (or lack of compliance) amongst South African 
employers.  Increasing the value of the parameter  to 2 yields V2, the squared wage gap, 
affording a measure of the severity of violation.  
The estimates in the last row of Table 1 show that in South Africa V0 was 55% in 2001 and 
45% in 2007. This suggests that in 2001 55 % of employers were not complying with minimum 
wage legislation, or in other words, 55% of employees were violated and receiving sub-minimum 
wages. By 2007, the overall rate of violation had subsided to 45%. The figures for V1 were 25% 
in 2001 and 16% in 2007. Hence, in 2001, employees who were violated received, on average, 
wages that were 25% below their average sectoral determination minima. In 2007, this estimate 
was 16%, indicating that non-complying employers paid wages that were on average 16% short 
of the legislative minima in that year. The estimates for V2 show that, on average, the gap 
between wages paid by non-complying employers and the stipulated minima, squared, was 15% 
and 8% in 2001 and 2007 respectively.   
The headline result here is that absolute levels of violation in South Africa are disturbingly 
high, both in terms of the number and percentage of individuals violated, with the estimates of 
V0 reaching more than 50 % in several sectors. Indeed, in some sectors, V0 soars to over 65%, a 
deeply worrying result. The high estimates for V0 are reflective of a significant number of 
employers in South Africa who are violating minimum wage laws across all sectoral 
determinations. On average, the data suggest that in 2007, 45 % of all workers ostensibly covered 
by sectoral determinations were not being paid the legal minimum. This ranged from a low of 9 













An second interesting trend in the violation estimates presented here is that there seems to 
have been a significant decline in violation across several sectors (at the 5 % level) between 2001 
and 2007, both in terms of the number of individuals violated (as measured by V0) and in the 
depth and severity of violation (as approximated by V1 and V2 respectively). This decline was 
most notable amongst Domestic and Farm workers, who both experienced a significant decline 
in the numbers of workers violated of between 50 and 60 percentage points respectively in the 
2001 to 2007 period. The data show that whilst 63% of all Domestic workers were earning below 
the minimum in 2001, by 2007 the V0 measure of violation for this cohort had subsided to 39%. 
The figures for Farm workers in turn yield a decline in violation from 78% to 55%. Indeed, when 
examining the depth of such violation, the positive impact of legislation is clear. Hence, whilst 
Domestic workers were on average being paid 30% below the minimum in 2001, by 2007 this 
estimate had fallen to 13%. For Farm workers, the depth of violation declined by 21 percentage 
points, that is, from 38% to 17%, during this time.  Viewed collectively then, the data for South 
Africa suggests that although non-compliance levels of employers with minimum wage 
legislation, or in other words, violation, remain high, there is some evidence to suggest that 
enforcement improved slightly during the 2001 to 2007 period. The proportion of violated 
workers fell from 76% to 72%, and the mean gap between their wages and the minima declined 
from 21% to 13% during this time. All changes noted here are significant at the 5 % level. 
Despite the positive trend of declining levels of violation, the notion of particularly high levels of 
violation, at above 70% for instance, amongst South African employers in vulnerable sectors 


















Table 1: Estimates of the Index of Violation, LFS September 2001-2007  
 2001 2007 Change 01-07 
Sectoral Determination  V0 V1 V2  V0 V1 V2  V0 V1 V2 
Retail Sector          
Managers Area A 0.20 0.07 0.05 0.16 0.04 0.02 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 
Managers Area B 0.23 0.10 0.06 0.08 0.03 0.02 -0.15 -0.07 -0.04 
Managers Area C 0.32 0.12 0.07 0.36 0.14 0.06 0.04 0.02 -0.01 
Clerks Area A 0.35 0.14 0.07 0.42 0.15 0.08 0.07 0.01 0.01 
Clerks Area B 0.36 0.14 0.08 0.56 0.22 0.12 0.20 0.08 0.04 
Clerks Area C 0.51 0.27 0.18 0.56 0.25 0.14 0.05 -0.02 -0.04 
Sales Assistant Area A 0.30 0.12 0.06 0.26 0.11 0.06 -0.04 -0.01 0.00 
Sales Assistant Area B 1.00 0.62 0.47 0.51 0.31 0.21 -0.49* -0.31 -0.26 
Sales Assistant Area C 0.40 0.24 0.15 0.32 0.26 0.21 -0.08 0.02 0.06 
Shop Assistant Area A 0.40 0.16 0.09 0.41 0.10 0.04 0.01 -0.06 -0.05 
Shop Assistant Area B 0.45 0.21 0.13 0.53 0.22 0.12 0.08 0.01 -0.01 
Shop Assistant Area C 0.67 0.39 0.26 0.54 0.23 0.13 -0.13 -0.16* -0.13 
Drivers Area A 0.24 0.10 0.05 0.17 0.04 0.02 -0.07 -0.06 -0.03 
Drivers Area B 0.51 0.19 0.10 0.49 0.15 0.07 -0.02 -0.04 -0.03 
Drivers Area C 0.78 0.26 0.13 0.23 0.11 0.06 -0.55 -0.15 -0.07 
Forklift operators Area A 0.39 0.12 0.04 0.65 0.15 0.04 0.26 0.03 0.00 
Total Retail Sector 0.40 0.18 0.11 0.39 0.14 0.07 -0.01 -0.04 -0.04* 
Domestic workers          
Area A 0.54 0.22 0.12 0.31 0.09 0.04 -0.23* -0.13* -0.08* 
Area B & C 0.72 0.38 0.23 0.51 0.19 0.10 -0.21 -0.19* -0.13* 
Total Domestic Workers 0.63 0.30 0.17 0.39 0.13 0.06 -0.24* -0.17* -0.11* 
Farm Workers          
Area A 0.60 0.20 0.10 0.41 0.10 0.04 -0.19* -0.10* -0.06* 
Area B & C 0.85 0.46 0.29 0.65 0.21 0.10 -0.20* -0.25* -0.19* 
Total Farm Workers 0.78 0.38 0.23 0.55 0.17 0.07 -0.23* -0.21* -0.16* 
Forestry Workers 0.55 0.25 0.15 0.53 0.16 0.07 -0.02 -0.09 -0.08 
Taxi workers          
Taxi operators Drivers 0.31 0.13 0.07 0.45 0.18 0.09 0.14 0.05 0.02 
Taxi operators Fare collector 0.16 0.03 0.01 0.64 0.24 0.14 0.48* 0.21 0.13 
Total Taxi operators 0.29 0.12 0.06 0.47 0.18 0.09 0.18* 0.06 0.03 
Security Workers          
Area 1 0.62 0.27 0.14 0.69 0.29 0.15 0.07 0.02 0.01 
Area 2 0.58 0.28 0.15 0.50 0.23 0.14 -0.08 -0.05 -0.01 
Area 3 0.69 0.27 0.14 0.10 0.08 0.07 -0.59* -0.19 -0.07 
Area 4 0.87 0.36 0.18 0.63 0.25 0.12 -0.24 -0.11 -0.06 
Area 5 0.51 0.21 0.12 0.67 0.28 0.14 0.16* 0.07 0.02 
 Total Security workers 0.58 0.25 0.13 0.67 0.28 0.14 0.09 0.03 0.01 
Hospitality Workers          
Hospitality small firms 0.51 0.25 0.15 0.37 0.16 0.09 -0.14 -0.09 -0.06 
Hospitality med-large firms 0.35 0.13 0.06 0.25 0.08 0.04 -0.10 -0.05 -0.02 
 Total Hospitality Workers 0.41 0.17 0.09 0.29 0.10 0.05 -0.12* -0.07* -0.04* 
Contract cleaners          
Area 1 0.38 0.13 0.06 0.50 0.17 0.09 0.12 0.04 0.03 
Area 2 0.65 0.27 0.14 0.52 0.19 0.10 -0.13 -0.08 -0.04 
Area 3 0.27 0.11 0.06 0.35 0.13 0.07 0.08 0.02 0.01 
 Total Contract cleaners 0.36 0.13 0.07 0.44 0.16 0.08 0.08 0.03 0.01 
Civil engineering  0.02 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.04 0.02 0.07 0.04 0.02 
Total 0.55 0.25 0.15 0.45 0.16 0.08 -0.10* -0.09* -0.07* 
Source: Authors’ calculations using LFS September 2007 (StatsSA) and ECC sectoral determinations.   














Further scrutiny of the results above reveals that, across the sectors, Security Workers are 
clearly the most violated cohort, and this holds under all three violation indices. 67 % of Security 
workers earn sub-minimum wages, which is the highest estimate amongst all sectors. On average, 
the estimated depth of violation measure, V1, suggests that Security workers earned 25% below 
the minima in 2001, which worsened to 28% by 2007. This depth of violation is 7 times higher 
than that found amongst Civil Engineers, who record the lowest levels of violation.  
In Table 2 below, the estimates for the three indices have been ranked, starting with the 
highest level of violation. For instance, a rank of 1 for Forklift Operators within area A in the 
Retail sector suggests that this is the most violated cohort within this sector in terms of the 
numbers of individuals earning sub-minimum wages. However, we observe a rank reversal 
between indices for some sectors. For example, in 2007 although Forklift Operators are the 
worse off in the Retail sector relative to other occupation groups, they are not the worst off 
cohort in terms of the shortfall of their wages from the minimum (only 15 %). In this respect, 
the worst off cohort in the Retail sector are Sales Assistants in Area B, who are the farthest away 
from the legal minima (31%). 
Table 2: Rank of the Index of Violation, LFS September 2001- 2007  
   2001 2007 
Sectoral Determination  V0 V1 V2  V0 V1 V2 
Retail and Wholesale sector  6 5 5 6 6 5 
 Domestic Workers 2 2 2 7 7 7 
Farm Workers 1 1 1 2 3 4 
Forestry Workers 4 4 3 3 4 6 
Taxi Operators 8 8 8 4 2 2 
Security Workers 3 3 4 1 1 1 
Hospitality Workers 5 6 6 8 8 8 
 Contract Cleaners 7 7 7 5 5 3 
Civil engineering  9 9 9 9 9 9 
Source: Authors’ calculations using LFS September 2001 and 2007 (StatsSA) and ECC sectoral determinations.   
The figure below shows the relationship between the ranks on the three indices for the 
different sectors, in order to shed some light on whether there is a relationship between the 













a linear relationship between the rank of the violation indices, (V0; V1), (V0; V2) and (V1; V2), 
barring a few outliers. 
Figure 2: Relationship between rank of violation indices, 2007 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using LFS September 2007 (StatsSA) and ECC sectoral determinations.   
In order to ascertain the robustness of the three indices in measuring violation, notably V0, 
V1, and V2, Spearman’s rank correlation coefficients are estimated below to evaluate the degree 
to which these three measures of violation produce a similar ranking between sectors. The table 
below shows the rank correlation coefficients between the three indices. All correlation 
coefficients were significant at the 1 % level. A higher value for the rank correlation coefficient 
indicates that a stronger correlation was present between the ranks of the violation measures 
used.  
Table 3:  Spearman’s Rank Order Correlation Coefficients between Violation Indices, 2001-2007 
 Index Coefficient 
 2001 2007 
 V0 and V1 0.9699* 0.8071* 
 V0 and V2 0.9496* 0.7667* 
V1 and V2 0.9909* 0.9865* 
Source: Authors’ calculations using LFS September 2001 and 2007 (StatsSA) and ECC sectoral determinations 
Note: * indicates significance at 1%.  
 
In both 2001 and 2007, the correlations between V0, V1, and V2 are all very high, ranging 
from about 77% to 99%. Thus, the rankings of violation according to the three indices used are 
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other two indices, namely (V0; V1), and (V0; V2), has declined significantly between 2001 and 
2007.  
The correlation coefficient between the V0 and the V1 index is lower than that between the 
V0 and the V2 index in both 2001 and 2007, suggesting that the headcount of violated individuals 
and the degree of violation may be more closely related than the share of violations is with the 
degree of violation squared. The lower correlation between these two indices may reflect the fact 
that the changes in them are driven by different underlying factors. On the other hand, the high 
correlation coefficients between the rankings of the depth of violation, V1, and the squared 
depth of violation, V2, (0.99 in both years) are an unsurprising result, recalling that the latter 
measure is simply the square of the former.  
Another measure of relevance here is the Kaitz index, which provides a measure of the 
rigidity or ‘toughness’ of the minimum wage set (Andalón and Pagés, 2008). The Kaitz ratio is 
usually estimated as the ratio of the minimum wage,   , to the mean wage,  . However, 
according to the literature (Andalón and Pagés, 2008) in countries with substantial levels of wage 
inequality, or if the minimum wage is suspected to influence the mean wage, it is preferable to 
use the median wage to estimate the Kaitz ratio instead of the mean. Following the literature, in 
the calculations here of the Kaitz index for South Africa, the median wage was used as the 
denominator. However, given that the minimum wage in South Africa is specific to sector, 
occupation, and location, another important question arises. It is unclear whether the Kaitz index 
should be calculated as the ratio of the minimum wage to the sector-occupation-location specific 
median wage, or instead estimated using the median wage for all salaried employment. According 
to Andalón and Pagés (2008), the latter measure is preferred from a methodological point of 
view since it serves to control for reverse causality. If , for instance, there is a higher share of 
informal employment or self-employment in total employment, a lower estimate may be obtained 
for the mean wage in a given sector-occupation-location category, thereby yielding a higher ratio 













types of measures of the Kaitz index are included in the analysis below. The first (K1) is the ratio 
of the mean adjusted minimum wage (in the respective sector-occupation-location group) to the 
median wage in overall salaried employment, whilst the second measure (K2) is the ratio of the 
mean minimum wage in that category relative to the median wage in each sector-occupation-
location group. For the reasons noted above, the preferred index is the one estimated using the 
median for overall employment, namely K1. A study by Levin-Waldman (1997) suggests that the 
minimum wage be set at the level of the median wage for the unskilled. Therefore, a third 
measure has been included, which provides the ratio of the minimum wage within each group to 
the median wage for unskilled workers (that is, Domestic workers and workers engaged in 
Elementary occupations).  
Table 4 below presents estimates of the Kaitz ratio for South Africa for 2001 and 2007 by 
sector. The two specifications of the Kaitz index, K1 and K2, were approximated for each of the 
sectoral determinations by their respective sector-occupation-location categories.  A summary of 
the Kaitz estimates for each sector is shown here, and the complete table is included in the 
appendix (Table A4). The indices have been ranked, starting from the highest value to the lowest. 
The ranks of the indices have been shown in parentheses in the table. For instance, the rank of 
the K1 Kaitz index for the Security sector was 1 in both 2001 and 2007, reflecting that the Kaitz 
index for Security workers was the highest among all other sectors in both years.  
The median wage for overall salaried employment was R1 600 in 2001 and R2 500 in 2007 
respectively.  In 2001, the K1 Kaitz ratio for South Africa, estimated as the ratio of the mean 
minimum wage to the overall median wage, was 0.70, and subsided to 0.61 in 2007. Comparing 
the Kaitz estimates for South Africa with other developing countries indicates that these 
countries also yield high measures of the ratio of the minimum to the median wage.  The Kaitz 
index for Kenya stood at 0.76 for general workers during 1998 to 1999 (Andalón and Pagés, 













minimum wages in the more skilled occupations set at above two-thirds of the median (Maloney 
and Nuñez, 2003).  
The K2 Kaitz estimates have been estimated using the ratio of the minimum wage to the 
median in each sector-occupation-location group. For instance,  an estimated Kaitz ratio of 0.55 
for Retail Sector Managers in Area A in 2007 represents the ratio of the mean adjusted monthly 
minimum wage for Retail Sector Managers in Area A (R 3 826) to the median wage in that 
sector-occupation-location category (R7 000). Similarly, the Kaitz ratio for the Retail sector 
represents the ratio of the mean monthly adjusted minimum wage in the Retail sector to the 
median wage of salaried workers in the Retail sector. In 2007, the mean adjusted minimum wage 
for Retail sector works was R 2 304, while the median wage of covered workers in that sector 
was 2 500, yielding a Kaitz ratio of 0.92. Several sectors record a K2 ratio of above 1 in both 
years, namely Farming, Forestry and Security.  What is clear from the estimates below is that the 
ratio of the minimum wage to the median is quite high in South Africa in several sectors, 
irrespective of whether the overall median or the group-specific median is used. 





















Retail 1.03 (2) 1.07 (5) 4.43 (2) 0.92 (2) 0.92 (5) 2.30 (2) 
Domestic 0.40 (9) 1.60 (2) 1.57 (9) 0.33 (9) 0.96 (4) 0.82 (9) 
Farm workers 0.53 (7) 1.87 (1) 2.06 (7) 0.43 (7) 1.13 (2) 1.07 (7) 
Forestry 0.44 (8) 1.18 (4) 1.84 (8) 0.38 (8) 1.06 (3) 0.96 (8) 
Taxi 0.72 (6) 0.76 (8) 3.37 (4) 0.70 (4) 0.88 (7) 1.75 (4) 
Security 1.18 (1) 1.26 (3) 5.12 (1) 1.06 (1) 1.40 (1) 2.66 (1) 
Hospitality 0.72 (5) 0.96 (6) 2.79 (6) 0.58 (6) 0.73 (8) 1.45 (6) 
Contract cleaning 0.75 (4) 0.81 (7) 3.03 (5) 0.63 (5) 0.91 (6) 1.57 (5) 
Civil engineering 0.99 (3) 0.26 (9) 3.94 (3) 0.82 (3) 0.22 (9) 2.05 (3) 
Total 0.70 ... 1.48 ... 2.93 ... 0.61 ... 1.17 ... 1.52 ... 
Source: Authors’ calculations using LFS September 2001 and 2007 (StatsSA) and ECC sectoral determinations.   
Notes: 1. The Kaitz ratio is computed as the ratio of the mean adjusted minimum wage in each sector-occupation-location 
cell to the median wage of all salaried workers (that is, excluding self-employed workers). The ratio of the minimum wage 
to the group median is the ratio of the minimum wage by sector, occupation, and location to the median wage in each 
sector-occupation-location category.  
2. Unskilled workers include Elementary workers and Domestic workers.  
3. All estimates are for the weighted sample. 














 Comparison of the estimates for the K1 and the K2   Kaitz indices uncovers two interesting 
trends. Firstly, using the overall median wage to estimate the Kaitz index, that is K1, yields lower 
estimates of the toughness of the minima set than when the group-specific median is employed 
(K2). In both years, the K1 estimates are lower than those for K2, barring the estimates for the 
Civil Engineering sector, which yields a  substantially larger K1 estimate than K2 in both years, and 
the Retail sector, for which identical estimates for K1 and K2 in 2007 (0.92) are obtained. The 
second trend to be noted is that there seems to be a decline in the estimated Kaitz ratios between 
2001 and 2007 in all sectors, with the exception of the 2007 K2 estimates for the Taxi, Security 
and Contract Cleaning sectors, which increased during this period.  
 The results from the third measure included in the table, that is, the ratio of the minimim 
wage to the median wage for the unskilled, are also interesting. This ratio is generally above 1 in 
both years, signifying that the minimum wage in South Africa is set very high relative to the 
median wage for unskilled employment. For instance, in 2001 the minimum for Retail Sector 
workers was more than four times higher than the median for the unskilled. By 2007, although 
this ratio had declined, it remained high, the minimum wage within this sector standing at more 
than double the median for the unskilled. Compared with the Kaitz measures, K1 and K2, The 
ratio of the minimum to the median of the unskilled is generally higher. Whilst the gap between 
the sectoral minima and wages in unskilled employment became smaller across all sectors during 
the 2001 and 2007 interval, they still remained high.  
A graph of the rank of the K1 index, which is the preferred measure of here, versus the ranks 
of the violation measures (V0, V1, and V2) confirms the positive association between the rigidity 













Figure 3: Relationship between Ranks of Violation indices and Kaitz index 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using LFS September 2001 and 2007 (StatsSA) and ECC sectoral determinations. 
Notes: The Kaitz index here is the Kaitz 1 index estimated using the median of overall salaried employment.  
 
In order to investigate whether there is indeed a correlation between the size of the violation 
indices (V0, V1, and V2) and the level at which the minimum wage is set relative to the median 
wage (the Kaitz index), Spearman’s rank order correlation coefficients between the ranks of the 
two Kaitz measures presented above and the three violation indices were estimated. The 
correlations between the ranks of the Kaitz measures, K1 and K2, were positive and significant at 
1% in both years (0.45 and 0.46 in 2001 and 2007 respectively). The significant rank correlation 
coefficients for the two indices suggest that they are both robust measures for the ratio of the 
Kaitz index since there are similarities in the rankings of the sectors under the two indices. Table 5 
overleaf presents estimates of the rank order correlation coefficients between the Kaitz index 
measures (K1 and K2) and the violation indices (V0, V1, and V2) respectively. All estimated 
correlation coefficients were statistically significant at either the 1% or 5% level, suggesting that 
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Table 5: Spearman’s Rank Order Correlation between Kaitz index and Violation Indices, 2001-2007 
 Coefficient  
Kaitz 1 
 (wM/median salaried) 
 
Coefficient  
Kaitz 2   !/ "#$%&' ()*+,) 
 2001 2007 2001 2007 
 V0 and Kaitz 0.3786** 0.4408* 0.9183* 0.8897* 
 V1 and Kaitz 0.3851** 0.4905* 0.9168* 0.8939* 
V2 and Kaitz 0.3959** 0.5231* 0.8837* 0.8677* 
Source: Authors’ calculations using LFS September 2001 and 2007 (StatsSA) and ECC sectoral determinations. 
Note: * indicates statistical significance at 1*, ** indicates statistical significance at 5%, *** indicates statistical significance 
at 10%.   
 
 As seen in the estimates above, the rank correlation coefficients between the K2 index and 
the violation indices are very high. For instance, the 2007 estimate of the rank correlation 
between V0 and K2 is 89%, suggesting that the sectoral rankings according to the K2 index are 
very similar to the rankings according to the violation index V0. An interesting trend in the data 
is that there seems to be a slight increase in the correlation coefficients between the violation 
indices and the first Kaitz index, K1, between 2001 and 2007, whilst the correlation coefficients 
between the measures of violation and the K2   index decreased during this period. On the basis of 
this result then, one can infer that the similarity in rankings according to the K1 index and the 
violation indices became more similar between 2001 and 2007, while the correlation between the 
K2 index and the violation measures decreased. This provides some support for the choice of the 
K1 index as the preferred specification of the Kaitz index in terms of explaining violation.  
In summary, the rank correlation coefficients above suggest a significant correlation 
between the level, depth, and severity of non-compliance (as measured by V0, V1, and V2 
respectively) and the level of the minimum wage relative to the median wage within the sector-
occupation-location categories. The sign of the coefficients reflect a positive relationship 
between ranks of the level of the sectoral determination (that is, the minimum wage,  ) relative 
to the median wage, and violation (non-compliance). This result is consistent with the 
conclusions of the Andalón and Pagés (2008) study discussed earlier in the literature review, 
specifically that the Kaitz index (essentially, the rigidity of the minima set) is positively correlated 













 So far, the analysis has concentrated on providing a descriptive overview of the sectoral 
minima in South Africa, and some key measures associated with violation.  The discussion now 
turns, in the following section, towards an econometric investigation of the various determinants 
of violation in South African labour market, and attempts to isolate their simultaneous impact on 
violation.  
IV b:  The Determinants of Violation in South Africa 
For the analysis of the determinants of individual violation, we first use a probit14 model to 
investigate the determinants of the probability of an individual being violated, or in other words, 
receiving a wage below the stipulated minimum.  The probit model is used to determine whether 
these factors do indeed change the likelihood of an individual being paid a wage below the 
minimum, as well as to quantify the marginal effects of the variables. Here, the dependent 
variable V0 is a categorical variable, taking on a value of 1 if the individual’s wage is below their 
respective minimum or 0 if their wage is at or above the minimum. The violation probit is 
estimated for the full sample of employed individuals (excluding the self-employed since they pay 
their own wages) who are covered by the DoL sectoral determinations. Next, for the reduced 
sample of violated individuals (V0=1) only, the determinants of the depth of violation (as 
measured by V1) are estimated by means of OLS regression15. Hence V1 was estimated for each 
individual and used as the dependent variable in the regression16.  
                                                           
14 A probit model estimates the factors that influence the probability that an event A may occur, where 1)(0 ≤≤ AP  
. The equation we wish to estimate takes on the following form:  
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where Y is the binary dependent variable V0 equal to 1 for violated individuals earning wages below the statutory minimum 
and 0 for their non-violated counterparts, X is a vector of explanatory variables, β are the parameters to be estimated, 
and φ  is the standard normal cumulative distribution function (McCullagh and Nelder, 1989). 
15 The OLS equation for the depth of violation V1 takes on the generic form:  
Yi = a + b Xi + ui  
where the Yi refers to the measure of violation V1 for the worker i as being a function of the kx1 vector, X of relevant 
explanatory variables of violation, while b is the 1xk vector of parameters. The disturbance term and the constant are 
captured by ui and a respectively. The OLS method is used to estimate the mean effect of the various explanatory variables 
on the dependent variable V1 (Cassella & Berger, 2002). 




















 A variety of explanatory variables were included in the analysis such as demographic, firm-
level, contractual, and spatial/geographic characteristics. One interesting innovation in this paper 
is to provide a set of spatial and density variables to proxy for the probability of an employer 
being ‘enforced’ upon. Initially, a number of spatial level variables were constructed and 
investigated, which were then narrowed down to a preferred specification.  Some of the relevant 
variables constructed in this context included  workers per square kilometre (the ratio of the 
number of employed in the district council to the area of the district council in square 
kilometres17),   the unemployment rate in the district council, the number of labour inspectors 
weighted by the proportion of employed in the district council, employment density (the ratio of 
the number of employed in the district council to the population of the DC), and the 
unemployment ratio (the ratio of the number of unemployed to the population in the DC18). 
Due to some of these spatial variables being correlated with each other, only s subset of these 
variables was included in the probit equations. The spatial variables that were eventually selected 
to be included in the analysis were the log of the workers per square kilometre, the log of the 
inspectors per DC weighted, and the unemployment rate in the district council.  
In order to investigate whether the results obtained from the OLS regression analysis hold 
not only at the mean, but also across the entire distribution of violated individuals, a quantile 
regression approach is next employed. The results from this analysis will enable us to examine 
whether the determinants of violation differ depending on whether the depth of violation is high 
or low.  The approach for generating ‘regression quantiles’ was first introduced by Bassett and 
Koenker (1978). They proposed the least absolute error (LAE) as a more efficient measure than 
the least squares estimator in any linear model for which the median is a superior measure than 
the mean as an estimator of location (Basset and Koenker, 1978).  The ./ regression quantile, 
                                                           
17 The area of each district council was available from the website of the Municipal Demarcation Board of South Africa. 
<www.demarcation.org.za>.  
18 Note the distinction between the unemployment rate and the unemployment ratio. The unemployment ratio measures 
the share of the population in the DC who is unemployed, while the unemployment rate is the share of the labour force 












where . ranges from 0 to 1, may be obtained by solving the minimization problem of the LAE 
estimator as follows: 
0123456 7 8 .|:;  ;<|;4=;:?@AB@3C D 8 1  .	|:;  ;<|;4=;:?@EB@3C F 
where =:;: /  1,… , GC  is a sample of random variables  on the regression H;  :;  ;I, 
with a distribution function F,  =;: /  1,… , GC   is a set of K-vectors, and < are the regression 
parameters. When .  0.5 , the solution to the minimization problem of the  LAE estimator is 
that for the median quantile (Koenker and Bassett, 1978; Koenker and Hallock, 2001).  
The regression results are now discussed. The estimation of the violation probit started with 
the full sample of employed19  salaried workers whom are covered by the ECC sectoral 
determinations. Next, in the OLS regression on the determinants of the depth of violation, V1, 
the sample was reduced to cover only violated workers, that is, workers for whom K  1. The 
violation probit excludes the self-employed and wage earners not covered by the ECC minimum 
wages, whilst the OLS regression of on the depth of violation exclude those wage earners whose 
wages are at or above the statutory minimum. Hence, the estimates derived by the violation 
probit and the depth of violation function may be biased due to the fact that they are both based 
on non-random, truncated versions of the original sample of covered workers (Bhorat and 
Liebbrant, 2001). Thus, in all versions of our modelling, the Heckman two-step approach was 




                                                           
19 The working age population was assumed as 15 to 65 years old. The broad definition of employment was used, that is, 
including discouraged workseekers.  
20 After the violated probit was estimated, the estimates were used to derive an estimate for the inverse Mills ratio 
(lambda) to be included in the OLS and quantile regressions on V1 and V2. The derived depth of violation function is 
therefore conditional on the individual characteristics of the employed receiving wages below the minimum as well as 














For the covariates which are dummy variables, the following are the referent variables: 
Race: African 
Age: 16-24 years 
Area type A: other area type (B, C, D, or E)  
Sectoral determination:  Domestic workers 
Union status: Non-union member  
Firm size: Large firms  
Contract: Non-written, non-permanent 
Sector: Informal, non-public.   
The key results for the violation probit, and the OLS and quantile regressions on V1 for 
2007 are presented in Tables 5 through 7 below.  
Table 5 below presents the results from the probit on individual violation. Four 
specifications are shown. Due to the presence of collinearity between some of the provincial 
dummies and the spatial density variables (which are measured for each of the district councils 
within a province, and are hence correlated with some of the provincial dummy variables), the 
provincial dummies and the spatial density variables could not be included in the specifications at 
the same time. In Specification I, only the provincial dummies are included while the spatial 
density variables were omitted.  In the second specification, the individual characteristics (race, 
gender, age, education) were excluded while the spatial/density variables were included. In 
Specification III, individual characteristics as well as the spatial density variables, while the 
provincial dummies have been left out. This is our preferred specification, since it contains a full 
range of spatial density variables and individual characteristics, and yields a relatively high 













model21.  It is worth noting here, however, that while the stepwise regression technique is useful 
in obtaining an additional specification of the model, the results must be treated with caution. 
The stepwise regression approach has been much criticized in the literature as resulting in biased 
estimates of regression coefficients, as well as underestimating the variability of the regression 
coefficients in the final model (Steyerberg, Eijkemans, and Habbema, 1999). Furthermore, in 
small datasets, stepwise regression has been shown to leave out important variables (Steyerberg, 
Eijkemans, and Habbema, 1999). Therefore, although the results from the stepwise estimation 
are included here in Specification IV, it is not the preferred specification (The preferred 
specification is the third specification in which a full range of spatial density covariates are 
included).  
A preliminary analysis of the results in Table 5 suggests that there are a wide range of 
variables impacting on the probability of violation, such as individual, sectoral, enterprise, 
contractual and spatial characteristics. Specification III is our preferred specification, and 
explains 16.46% of the variation in the dependent variable.  
 
 
                                                           
21 Stepwise selection is a method allowing for the selection of independent variables for inclusion in a regression 
model. One type of stepwise selection is forward selection which starts by assuming a regression model with only one 
explanatory variable, L: :  IL D M 
where y is the dependent variable, I is the coefficient of the explanatory variable L, and M is the error term. The 
hypothesis that I  0 is then tested by means of an F-test, where the F-statistic is denoted by: 
 NO  PPQPPRSPP5T/SU		   
where VVWUis the total regression sum of squares due to q variables at the qth step in the stepwise process, and VV  VVWU  VVWUS is the ‘additional’ regression sums of squares due to the qth variable. If the NO value is significant at 
the selected level of significance, the qth variable is included in the regression equation, and the hypothesis that the 
coefficient of the qth variable in the regression is zero is rejected. Each time a new variable is inserted into the model, the 
F-statistic is re-estimated for all the variables in the model, and any variable that leads to an insignificant F-statistic is 
removed. When an F-statistic testing for the inclusion of a new variable is insignificant, the process ends and that variable 
and all subsequent variables are omitted form the model. Backward selection is a second type of stepwise regression. It 
employs a similar technique except that the number of variables included in the model starts with the full set, k, at the first 
step. Variables are removed if they yield insignificant F-statistics, until the last variable is reached (Thompson, 1978). The 
stepwise procedure employed here used both backward and forward selection, and identical results were obtained under 














Table 5: Results from violation probit, 2007 
Dependent variable:  
Probability of being violated 
Specifications   
I II III IV  












 White -0.357* 0.054 ... ... -0.356* 0.054 -0.510* 0.054 
Coloured -0.070** 0.123 ... ... -0.065** 0.123 -0.051 0.123 
Asian -0.141 0.023 ... ... -0.141 0.023 -0.152 0.023 









Speaks English -0.194** 0.062 ... ... -0.199** 0.062 -0.219* 0.062 
Can read -0.247** 0.886 ... ... -0.243** 0.886 ... ... 
Can write 0.145 0.885 ... ... 0.148 0.885 ... ... 
None-Grade 8 -0.011 6.580 ... ... -0.011 6.580 -0.020* 6.580 
Grade 9-11 -0.006 1.444 ... ... -0.007 1.444 -0.003 1.444 
Grade 12 -0.075 0.285 ... ... -0.075 0.285 -0.078 0.285 
Diploma -0.173* 0.042 ... ... -0.175* 0.042 -0.192** 0.042 





25-34 years 0.026 0.352 ... ... 0.027 0.352 0.026 0.352 
35-44 yrs -0.055 0.267 ... ... -0.054 0.267 -0.056 0.267 
45-54 years -0.116* 0.203 ... ... -0.113* 0.203 -0.115* 0.203 







Farm workers 0.263* 0.151 0.212* 0.150 0.262* 0.151 0.235* 0.151  
Retail Sector 0.284* 0.199 0.080 0.199 0.288* 0.199 0.256* 0.199  
Forestry  0.240* 0.015 0.168* 0.015 0.230* 0.015 0.201* 0.015  
Taxi Sector 0.260* 0.044 0.090 0.044 0.260* 0.044 0.232* 0.044  
Private Security  0.542* 0.091 0.426* 0.091 0.542* 0.091 0.585* 0.091  
Hospitality Sector 0.089 0.067 -0.027 0.066 0.089 0.067 0.062 0.067  
Contract Cleaning 0.275* 0.142 0.221* 0.142 0.278* 0.142 0.248* 0.142  













Union Workers -0.119* 0.218 -0.122* 0.218 -0.119* 0.218 -0.123* 0.218  
Written Contract  -0.150* 0.653 -0.149* 0.653 -0.153* 0.653 -0.142* 0.653  
Permanent/Fixed 0.030 0.775 0.010 0.775 0.030 0.775 ... ...  
Tenure (logged) -0.043* 1.448 -0.055* 1.450 -0.044* 1.448 -0.042* 1.448  
Formal  -0.023 0.578 -0.021 0.578 -0.021 0.578 ... ...  
Semi Formal -0.006 0.657 -0.015 0.656 -0.010 0.657 ... ...  
Small firms 0.074** 0.255 0.089* 0.255 0.075** 0.255 0.076* 0.255  
Medium Firms 0.148* 0.147 0.147* 0.146 0.149* 0.147 0.147* 0.147  
Medium-Large  0.042 0.158 0.043 0.158 0.040 0.158 0.039 0.158  
















Area A 0.009 0.732 -0.012 0.732 0.015 0.732 ... ... 
Western Cape -0.058 0.137  ... ... ... ... ... 
Eastern Cape 0.171* 0.092  ... ... ... ... ... 
Northern Cape 0.114** 0.029  ... ... ... ... ... 
Free State 0.163* 0.071  ... ... ... ... ... 
KwaZulu Natal 0.121* 0.179  ... ... ... ... ... 
North West 0.134* 0.067  ... ... ... ... ... 
Mpumalanga 0.055 0.081  ... ... ... ... ... 








 ... ... 0.001 3.290 -0.007 3.289 ... ... 
Inspectors ... ... -0.041* 4.895 -0.032* 4.896 -0.035* 4.896 
Unemployment  ... ... 0.737* 0.379 0.664* 0.379 0.685* 0.379 
          
Observed probability 0.416  0.416  0.416  0.255   
Predicted probability (x-bar) 0.386  0.405  0.386  0.157   
Number observed 6934  6968  6934  6934   
Chi-squared 555.45*  348.55*  547.6*  504.85*   
Pseudo R-squared 0.1661  0.1026  0.1646  0.1631  
Source: Own calculations using LFS September 2007, StatsSA.  
Notes: * Significant at the 1% level ** Significant at the 1% level*** Significant at the 1% level. Robust standard errors 
used. Specification IV is a Stepwise regression using backward selection. Significance level for removal from the model was 
set at 0.2. The regressions were repeated using forward selection. However, the results obtained were the same as when 














Since one of the key novelties in this analysis is the construction of the set of spatial/ 
density variables we will discuss the results from these variables first. The first spatial variable 
was a dummy variable for workers in areas that fell under ‘A’ type areas. As noted earlier, these 
areas are generally non-rural and are specific to the various sectoral determinations.  The Area A 
dummy variable was included in all specifications (barring the stepwise regression where the 
variable is dropped during the backward selection process). This variable was however, not 
found to be statistically significant in any of the specifications at the 10% level, suggesting that 
living in an area classified as an ‘A’ area as opposed to a less urban area did not significantly alter 
the probability of a wage earner being violated in 2007. The remaining spatial/density variables 
were included in specifications II, III and IV22, namely the log of workers per square kilometre 
by district council
23
, the number of inspectors per district council (logged)24, weighted by the 
proportion of the employed in that area, and the unemployment rate in the district council. 
These density variables are preferred to the provincial dummy variables since they are more 
specific and provide information by district council, which is the smallest area unit provided by 
the 2007 LFS. The results show that while the employment density, as captured by the log of the 
number of workers per square kilometre, was not a significant determinant of the probability of 
individual violation, the density of inspectors and the unemployment rate in the district council 
were significant at the 1% level. In all three specifications, namely specifications II, III, and IV, 
the results from the inspector density variable are negative and statistically significant at the 1% 
level. This is a powerful result, suggesting that the intensity of enforcement, as proxied for by the 
number of inspectors in an area, is a key predictor of whether an employer will violate minimum 
wage regulations or not. A larger presence of inspectors in an area possibly acts as a deterrent to 
                                                           
22 The log of workers per square kilometre however, gets dropped out during the selection process in the stepwise 
regression estimation procedure. 
23 The area by district council was available from the website of the Municipal Demarcation Board of South Africa. 
Available from: http://www.demarcation.org.za. 
24 Estimates for the number of labour inspectors by province for 2009 were obtained from the DoL. In order to control for 
the size of provinces, the mean number of inspectors per district council was estimated by taking the average of the 













employers considering violating the minimum wage, given the larger probability of being caught 
and penalized. This result has important implications for policy makers wishing to increase 
compliance with minimum wage legislation. The unemployment rate was also found to be a 
significant determinant of the probability of an individual being violated by their employer. The 
coefficient for the unemployment rate in the district council was positive and highly significant 
(1% level of significance) in all the specifications where included, indicating that a higher 
unemployment rate in the district council results in a larger probability of violation. This finding 
is consistent with the Ronconi (2008) paper, which found unemployment to be positively 
correlated with noncompliance in Argentina. This result can be understood if we think of a larger 
number of unemployed in an area as resulting in a higher probability of workers willing to work 
for sub-minimum wages, and in turn a higher likelihood that employers will violate the statutory 
minima, knowing that surplus labour is will be supplied at sub-minimum rates.  
The second innovation in this analysis is the inclusion of a number of enterprise-specific 
characteristics, as well as characteristics of the type of employment contract.  These 
characteristics were included in all three specifications. In all four specifications, the coefficients 
for small and medium-sized firms are positive and statistically significant. The results show that 
the size of an enterprise25 is a key predictor of the probability of individual violation. Employees 
in small and medium-sized enterprises (less than 20 workers) were more likely to be violated than 
those in large firms with 50 employees or more. In other words, according to the results, 
employers in larger firms are more likely to be enforced upon. Or rather, given their visibility, 
employers in large enterprises are less likely to want to engage in practices which violate the 
minimum wage. Another possibility is that large firms are more likely to be unionized than 
smaller firms. A dummy variable was included equal to 1 if a worker was part of a union, and 
equal to 0 for non-union members. As expected, the coefficient was negative and statistically 
                                                           
25 Small firms are those with less than 9 employees, medium firms are those with less than 19 employees, medium-large 
firms refers to enterprises with less than 50 employees, and large firms are those with 50 employees or more. The self-













significant in all four specifications, suggesting that union workers are less likely to be violated by 
employers than their counterparts who are not part of a union.  The key result here, however, is 
that large firms are less likely to violate even when controlling for the unionization of workers.  
Formal firms were defined as those who were registered and paid VAT, semi-formal firms 
were defined as those that met one of the above criteria, while informal firms were defined as 
those that neither reported themselves as registered nor as paying VAT. However, the formal 
and semi-formal coefficients were not found to be statistically significant at 10 % in any of the 
specifications in which they were included. In the stepwise regression, these variables were 
dropped out by the backward selection technique.  While the degree of formality of a firm does 
not seem to impact on whether or not employees are paid sub-minimum wages, whether a firm is 
located in the public sector or the private sector is a key determinant.  Individuals employed in 
public sector firms or in State owned enterprises (SOEs) were significantly less likely to be 
violated than those employed in the non-public sector, as evidenced by the negative and 
significant coefficient for the public sector dummy in all four specifications.  
In all four specifications, the dummy variable for a written contract yields a negative and 
statistically significant coefficient. Employees with a written contract are less likely to be violated 
than those with no contract or an informal contract. The dummy variable for a permanent/fixed 
period contract, however, was not statistically significant in any of the specifications, suggesting 
that individuals possessing a permanent or fixed period contract have the same likelihood of 
being violated as temporary, casual or seasonal workers. However, the duration of employment is 
a significant predictor of the probability of being violated. The tenure variable was derived using 
information in the LFS on the year the individual started working with the current employer. The 
variable was estimated as the log of the number of years of employment with the present 
employer. This coefficient was significant and negative in all specifications, indicating that a 













The individual characteristics included in Specifications I and III of the analysis were race, 
gender, age, ability to read and write, English as the home language, and education. From the 
results, it is clear that both race and gender are highly significant in determining whether or not 
an individual is violated and is paid a wage below his/her stipulated minima. The dummy 
variables for Whites and Coloureds have coefficients that are significant and negative, suggesting 
that these population groups have a lower probability of being violated than their African 
counterparts, controlling for spatial and sectoral characteristics. The coefficient for the dummy 
variable for females was positive and significant, suggesting that female workers are more likely 
to be violated than their male counterparts.  
The coefficients for the age variables are generally not statistically significant, barring the 45-
54 years old age group, which has a lower probability of being violated relative to those in the 15 
to 25 years old referent group.  
The results indicate that the literacy variables are important predictors of minimum wage 
violation. Individuals who can read and who speak English as a home language are less likely to 
be paid wages that fall below the stipulated minima. Examining the results from the educational 
splines however, we note that only the coefficient for Diploma is statistically significant. The 
coefficient is negative, suggesting that possession of a Diploma as opposed to a Matric education 
or lower reduces the likelihood of an individual being violated.  
From these results, it is clear that individual characteristics play an important role in 
determining the likelihood of an individual being violated by an employer. The addition of 
individual variables to specification II in the third specification increases the value of R-squared 
from 0.1026 to 0.1646. Hence, the goodness of fit of the model increases by 6.2%, evidencing 
the importance of individual variables in explaining violation. 
The results for the sectoral dummies are interesting. Barring the Hospitality sector and Civil 













workers employed in the Farm worker, Retail, Forestry, Taxi, Security, and Contract Cleaning 
sectors all had a lower probability of being violated. This result may seem surprising, given that 
the Domestic worker sector is generally deemed to be among the more vulnerable sectors, and 
may be a reflection of the larger presence of enforcement measures or labour inspectors in the 
Domestic worker sector.  
Due to collinearity, either provincial dummy variables or the density variables were included 
in a particular specification, but not both. The first specification includes the provincial dummy 
variables, whilst leaving out the density variables. The referent province was Gauteng. Barring 
Mpumalanga and the Western Cape, the coefficients for all the provinces were positive and 
significant at 1%. Hence, relative to individuals employed in Gauteng, those in other provinces 
were more likely to experience non-compliance by employers.  
Having investigated the determinants of the probability of individual violation, we now turn 
to an analysis of the factors that influence the depth of this violation. Table 6 shows the results 
from the OLS regressions on V1 for the same specifications as above. The lambda derived from 
the violation probit was included in the specifications (barring specification IV, where the lambda 
was dropped during the process of backward selection of the stepwise function). The lambda 
coefficient was statistically significant in Specification II at 5 %, suggesting that selection bias was 
present, which was corrected for. However, for the other two specifications (I and III) there was 
no apparent selection bias and the coefficient was insignificant.  
From the results in Table 6, we firstly note that although demographic characteristics were 
important in determining the probability of violation, they do not seem to be important in 
predicting the size of this violation. Put differently, while race and gender play a significant role 
in determining whether an individual is violated or not, they are irrelevant in determining the 
extent and degree of this violation (as measured by V1 and V2 respectively). The coefficients for 













The results suggest that the depth of violation seems to be driven more by sectoral, enterprise, 






























Table 6: Results from regression on V1 
 Dependent variable: V1  Specifications 









Race White -0.1897 ... -0.0005 ... 
Coloured -0.0128 ... 0.0158 ... 
Asian 0.0464 ... 0.0786 ... 
Gender Female 0.0346 ... -0.0078 ... 
Literacy Speaks English -0.1850** ... -0.1040** -0.0686** 
Can read -0.0493 ... 0.0169 0.0136 
Can write -0.0575 ... -0.0914 -0.0884 
Education splines None-Grade 8 0.0021 ... 0.0048 0.0050 
Grade 9-11 -0.0310* ... -0.0297* -0.0294* 
Grade 12 0.0203 ... 0.0418 0.0392 
Diploma -0.1489** ... -0.0816** -0.0799* 
Degree 0.0025 ... 0.0405 0.0423 
Age 25-34 years -0.0892* ... -0.0937* -0.0946* 
35-44 yrs -0.0789** ... -0.0604** -0.0598** 
45-54 years -0.0898** ... -0.0491 -0.0495 







Farm workers 0.1547** 0.1004* 0.0771* 0.0793* 
Retail Sector 0.2733* 0.1733* 0.1933* 0.1934* 
Forestry  0.1279*** 0.0922** 0.0571 0.0561 
Taxi Sector 0.2374* 0.1418* 0.1633* 0.1727* 
Private Security  0.4381* 0.2421* 0.2622* 0.2677* 
Hospitality Sector 0.1886* 0.1484* 0.1662* 0.1643* 
Contract Cleaning 0.2564* 0.1855* 0.1768* 0.1774* 













Union Workers -0.0722** -0.0387** -0.0338*** -
0.0335*** 
Written Contract  -0.0881** -0.0423** -0.0452** -0.0470* 
Permanent  -0.0244 -0.0477** -0.0319*** -
0.0320*** 
Tenure (logged) -0.0368* -0.0118 -0.0239* -0.0234* 
Formal  -0.0393** -0.0385** -0.0323*** -
0.0345*** 
Semi Formal -0.0755* -0.0786* -0.0755* -0.0773* 
Small firms 0.0231 0.0026 0.0030 ... 
Medium Firms 0.0232 -0.0177 -0.0181 ... 
Medium-Large firms -0.0009 -0.0107 -0.0133 ... 







Geographic Area A -0.0276** -0.0226*** -0.0252** -0.0241** 
Western Cape -0.0199** ... ... ... 
Eastern Cape 0.1043 ... ... ... 
Northern Cape -0.0098** ... ... ... 
Free State 0.0968 ... ... ... 
KwaZulu Natal 0.0437** ... ... ... 
North West 0.0627 ... ... ... 
Mpumalanga 0.0345 ... ... ... 
Limpopo 0.1248*** ... ... ... 
Density Log workers/sq km ... -0.0018 0.0020 ... 
Inspectors ... -0.0178** -0.0118*** -
0.0119*** 
Unemployment  ... 0.1624** 0.1689** 0.1497** 
Lambda 0.1902 -0.000003** 0.00001 ... 
Constant 0.3347** 0.4095* 0.4969* 0.5051* 
Number observed 2994 3004 2994 2994 
F-statistic  8.25* 18.02* 8.37* 10.7* 
Adjusted R-squared 0.1656 0.1090 0.1591 0.1570 
Source: Own calculations using LFS September 2007, StatsSA.  
Notes: * Significant at the 1% level** Significant at the 1% level*** Significant at the 1% level. 














The results above for the first set of covariates, the individual characteristics, show firstly 
that the race and gender effect observed in determining the probability of violation disappear 
when analysing the depth of this violation. The English as a home language variable however 
retains its significance in all the specifications. The negative and significant coefficient shows that 
individuals who speak English as a home language whom are violated by their employers 
experience a violation between 6.9 and 18.5 % lower than non-English speakers. The coefficients 
for the literacy variables (ability to read and write) were not found to be statistically significant in 
any of the specifications. Education, however, is an important determinant of the depth of 
violation experienced. The coefficients for the splines for Grades 9-11 and Diploma were 
significant and negative. Hence, individuals whom have competed Grades 9 to 11 experience a 
violation approximately 3 % smaller than their lesser educated counterparts with less than Grade 
9 education. Violated individuals with a Diploma qualification are between 8 and 14.9% closer to 
their respective minima than those possessing only a Matric qualification.  
The coefficients for the various age groups indicate that there is a youth bias among 
violating employers. Individuals in the 25-34 years and 35-44 years cohorts experience a lower 
depth of violation than individuals aged between 15 and 24, as evidenced by the negative and 
significant coefficients for the first two age splines in all four specifications.  In specification I, 
the coefficient of the 45-54 years age group was also significant and negative. Hence, there is a 
clear age effect in determining the depth of violation of an individual, with younger individuals 
worse off than their older counterparts.  
The results for the sectoral dummies were all significant and positive in the four 
specifications, with the exception of the coefficient for Forestry workers in Specifications III and 
IV that was insignificant. Hence, relative to Domestic Workers, violated workers in all sectors 
covered by ECC minimum wage legislation experience a higher depth of violation, that is, their 













Union workers have a significantly lower depth of violation than non-union workers, as 
suggested by the negative and significant coefficient for union workers in all specifications. 
Examining the contractual variables, we note that a written contract results in a significantly 
lower violation than a non-written contract. An interesting result is that although the possession 
of a permanent contract was not a significant determinant of the likelihood of violation, it is 
significant in determining the depth of violation. The coefficient for permanent contract is 
negative and significant in all four specifications and suggests that permanent contract holders 
who are violated have a depth of violation between 2 and 5% lower than individuals with 
temporary or other contract types. The coefficient of the tenure variable is significant and 
negative in all specifications, except for specification 2. A 1% increase in tenure may reduce the 
depth of violation by up to 3.7 %.  
It is interesting to note that while individuals employed in formal and semi-formal firms 
were found to be equally likely to be violated, employed in formal and semi-formal firms is 
associated with a significantly smaller depth of violation. In all specifications, the coefficients for 
the formal and semi-formal firms were negative and statistically significant.  
The size of the enterprise, which was found to be a significant determinant of the 
probability of being violated, was not found to have a significant impact o the depth of violation. 
The public sector/SOE variable was also not found to be statistically significant in influencing 
the depth of violation of an individual.  
We now turn to the last set of covariates, that is, the geographic and spatial variables. An 
interesting result is that the coefficient for the Area A dummy variable, which was not significant 
in determining the likelihood of violation, has a significant impact in determining the depth of 
violation. In all four specifications, the area A dummy yields a negative and significant 
coefficient, suggesting that workers in A type areas experience a depth of violation of between 2 













may be less remote than more rural areas, and hence may be more easily accessed by labour 
inspectors and enforced upon. Hence, the provincial dummy variables included in Specification I 
suggest that violated workers in the Western Cape and Northern Cape provinces experience a 
smaller depth of violation than those in the KwaZulu Natal and Limpopo provinces.  Examining 
the results for the spatial density variables, we note that the presence of labour inspectors in the 
district council not only significantly reduces the likelihood for violation, but also results in a 
significantly lower depth of violation. The coefficients for the inspector density variable were 
negative and significant in all the regressions, and show that a 1% increase in the density of 
labour inspectors significantly lowers the depth of violation by 1.2% for the individual. Another 
interesting result is that the local unemployment density has the effect of significantly increasing 
the severity of violation. A 1% increase in the local unemployment rate is associated with an 
increase in the size of violation by 15 to 16.9 %. Hence, workers in district councils with high 
rates of unemployment are worse off than those in areas with low unemployment rates. 
The results above showed that there are a range of variables impacting on the depth of 
violation of an individual, including individual characteristics such as education and age, as well 
as   sectoral, contractual, and spatial characteristics. However, it seems that there are two classes 
of variables driving the depth of violation, V1. On the one hand, firm-level and contractual 
factors seem to play an important role, notably the term of contract, union membership, the 
length of tenure, and the formality of the firm. On the other hand, spatial variables play a 
significant role. Two key results here are the significance of the labour inspectorate deployed on 
the size of the violation, as well as the local unemployment rate.  However, one of the important 
issues which arises from the above, is that we are only measuring the impact of the different 
covariates at the mean, while there may be different ‘behaviour patterns’ in the coefficients when 
examining different points in the conditional distribution of the depth of violation V1. In order 
to probe this question, we re-estimate the determinants of V1 at different percentile intervals in 














Having examined the determinants of the depth of violation at the mean of the distribution, we 
now use the quantile regression approach outlined above in order to analyse this relationship 
across the entire distribution of the depth of violation, V1.  Quantiles were formed around the 
10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentiles of violation. Quantile 1 thus contains the least violated 10 
% of individuals, quantile 2 the next 15 %, and so on. We can think of individuals in the top two 
quantiles as being the most violated, that is, their wages lie the farthest below the respective 
minima. Quantile 50 denotes the median quantile (the default quantile in Stata). Bootstrapped 
standard errors were estimated but are not shown here26.  
Table 7 presents a summary of the quantile regression results. They suggest that the size of 
the impact of the determinants of violation is sensitive to the choice of quantile. The results from 
the OLS estimation of the preferred specification have also been included in the table. In 
comparing the OLS results with the quantiles, we are effectively comparing the coefficients at the 











                                                           
26 The bootstrap technique particularly useful in obtaining estimates of the standard errors of quantile-regression 
coefficients. Stata performs quantile regression and obtains the standard errors using the method suggested by Koenker 
and Bassett (1978, 1982). Rogers (1992) reports that while these standard errors are satisfactory in the homoskedastic 













Table 7: Results from quantile regression V1 
   Quantile(θ)= 









Race White -0.0005 0.013 -0.015 -0.024 -0.036 0.136 
Coloured 0.0158 -0.014*** -0.018*** -0.026 -0.009 -0.001 
Asian 0.0786 0.124 0.102*** -0.050 -0.013 -0.161 
Gender Female -0.0078 0.006 -0.012 -0.010 0.010 -0.008 
Literacy Speaks English -0.1040** -0.005 -0.051 0.022 0.041 0.087 
Can read 0.0169 0.029 -0.092 -0.091 -0.199 -0.183 
Can write -0.0914 -0.044 0.071 0.065 0.164 0.136 
Education 
splines 
None-Grade 8 0.0048 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 
Grade 9-11 -0.0297* -0.004 -0.013** -0.015*** -0.008 0.002 
Grade 12 0.0418 0.006 0.008 -0.013 -0.018 -0.021 
Diploma -0.0816** -0.002 -0.042 -0.051 -0.033 -0.051 
Degree 0.0405 -0.024 -0.011 0.045 0.051 0.169*** 
Age 25-34 years -0.0937* -0.044* -0.049* -0.058* -0.076* -0.069* 
35-44 yrs -0.0604** -0.036* -0.028 -0.025 -0.045** -0.044*** 
45-54 years -0.0491 -0.025 -0.020 -0.018 -0.031 -0.040 







Farm workers 0.077* 0.051** 0.067* 0.090* 0.098* 0.067** 
Retail Sector 0.193* 0.066** 0.175* 0.237* 0.283* 0.209* 
Forestry  0.057 0.012 0.056 0.101* 0.134* 0.097** 
Taxi Sector 0.163* 0.054 0.141* 0.170* 0.192* 0.162* 
Private Security  0.262* 0.125* 0.2308 0.291* 0.252* 0.168* 
Hospitality Sector 0.166 0.075* 0.1208 0.179* 0.167* 0.134* 
Contract Cleaning 0.177* 0.063* 0.132* 0.171* 0.191* 0.137* 













Union Workers -0.034*** -0.007 -0.036* -0.044** -0.036** -0.023 
Written Contract  -0.045** -0.017*** -0.033* -0.065* -0.054* -0.051** 
Permanent  -0.032*** -0.015*** -0.021** -0.028*** -0.036* -0.011 
Tenure (logged) -0.024* -0.005*** -0.009*** -0.021* -0.023* -0.017** 
Formal  -0.032*** -0.040* -0.044** -0.046** -0.037*** -0.014 
Semi Formal -0.075* -0.020 -0.046** -0.074* -0.098* -0.107* 
Small firms 0.003 -0.001 -0.014 -0.011 -0.015 0.013 
Medium Firms -0.018 0.004 -0.011 -0.015 -0.015 -0.009 
Medium-Large  -0.013 -0.005 -0.007 -0.027*** -0.046* -0.058** 







Geographic Area A -0.0252** 0.006 -0.008 -0.021 -0.014 -0.018 
Density Log workers/ km
2
 0.0020 -0.0001 0.0027 0.0029 0.0076 0.0082 
Inspectors -0.0118*** -0.007 -0.019* -0.017* -0.020** -0.004 
Unemployment  0.1689** 0.113* 0.198* 0.220* 0.3228* 0.223** 
Lambda 0.00001 0.00003 0.00001 0.00010 0.00012*** 0.00024* 
Constant 0.497* 0.146* 0.293* 0.457* 0.572* 0.677* 
Number observed 2994 2994 2994 2994 2994 2994 
R-squared 0.1591 0.0418 0.0795 0.1026 0.1119 0.0863 
Source:  Own calculations using LFS September 2007, StatsSA.  
Notes: * Significant at the 1% level** Significant at the 5% level*** Significant at the 10% level 
 
The dummy variables for race and gender remain insignificant across the distribution 
(barring the Asian and Coloured dummies at the lower percentiles). This suggests that race and 













examining the coefficients for the literacy variables, we note that the ability to read and to write 
do not have a significant impact on the depth of violation at the mean nor across the entire 
distribution. The coefficient for the English as a home language dummy variable was found to be 
statistically significant at 5 % in the OLS regression, but was not statistically significant across the 
quantiles considered. This suggests that whilst speaking English as a home language was found to 
have a significant and negative impact on the depth of individual violation at the mean, this result 
does not hold true across the distribution of violated workers.    
The results from the educational splines are mixed. The coefficient for No education-Grade 
8, as well as Grade 12 are significant at the mean, but not across the rest of the distribution, 
implying that education did not significantly impact on the depth of violation for these workers. 
On the other hand, the coefficient for Grade 9-11 is only significant at the 25th percentile and at 
the median of the distribution. The coefficient is negative, suggesting that having an education of 
Grade 9 up till Grade 11 resulted in workers in the 25th and median percentiles experiencing a 
lower depth of violation than those who had completed less than a Grade 9 education.  
The results for age indicate that individuals aged between 25 and 34 years experienced a 
significantly lower depth of violation than the youngest age cohort aged between 15 and 24 years. 
This result is true at the mean as well as across all percentiles of the distribution. For those in the 
25 to 44 years age category, age becomes significant only when the depth of violation is high, that 
is, at the 75th and 95th percentiles. In other words, when the depth of violation is high, individuals 
in this age cohort experience a lower degree of violation than their younger counterparts aged 
between 15 and 24 years.   
Workers in the Farm, Retail and Contract Cleaning sectors experienced a higher depth of 
violation than Domestic workers at the mean as well as across all percentiles of the distribution. 
For these sectors, the magnitudes of the coefficients increase across the distribution, declining at 













Domestic workers increases as the depth of violation increases until the 95th percentile of 
violation is reached.  
As with the OLS results presented earlier on, the results from the quantile regressions 
confirm the importance of spatial/density variables in influencing the depth of violation of 
workers in South Africa. A higher density of labour inspectors results in a lower depth of 
violation at the mean of the distribution as well as at all regression quantiles considered.  The 
magnitudes of the coefficients for the inspector density variable vary between 0.004 and 0.02 
across the distribution, suggesting that a 1% increase in the density of inspectors leads to a 
decline in the depth of violation between 0.4 and 2%. . The unemployment rate is also clearly a 
robust variable in that it is highly significant not only at the mean, but also across all percentiles 
in the distribution.  
Given the importance of the firm/contractual and spatial variables, we now attempt to tease 
out the effects of these variables at different points of the depth of violation, V1, distribution.  
The derived coefficients (if statistically significant) for the contractual/firm (union worker, 
permanent, tenure, formal and semi-formal) and spatial (inspectors and unemployment rate) 
variables at different points in the distribution for 2007 are shown in Figures 4a and 4b 
respectively. In addition, we also display the mean OLS estimates. In all cases, these OLS 
coefficients are represented by the relevant horizontal dotted lines. The coefficients for the size 
of the enterprise are not significant across the distribution and are thus not included among the 
firm-level variables presented. Similarly, the coefficients for Area A and the log of workers per 
square kilometre have also been omitted from the spatial variables presented in figure 4b, since 
they do not yield coefficients that are statistically significant across the depth of violation 













Figure 4a: Estimates of the Impact of Firm/Contractual Characteristics on the Depth of Violation V1 by 
percentile, 2007.  
 
Source: Own calculations using LFS September 2007, StatsSA.  
 
The first of the firm-level/contractual characteristics investigated was union membership of 
the employed individual. The variable that captures union membership yields a significant and 
negative coefficient at the mean estimate of the depth of violation, as well as across most 
percentiles, barring the tails of the distribution. As seen in the figure above, the size of the 
coefficient of the union membership dummy variable fluctuates around the mean OLS estimate. 
The line representing the size of the union coefficient falls below the mean at the 20th percentile, 
and rises above the mean OLS line again at the 65th percentile. Interestingly enough, the 
percentiles where the graph of the union coefficient lies below the mean OLS estimate 
corresponds to the percentiles where the coefficient is statistically significant. For these 
percentiles, the size of the coefficient varies between -0.03 and -0.05.  Therefore, we can infer 
that at these percentiles, union membership significantly reduced the depth of violation of an 
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Turning to the results for the contractual variables, a written contract resulted in a negative 
and significant coefficient for all percentiles estimated, except at the lower end of the distribution 
(that is, below the 20th percentile). The line representing the size of the coefficient for the written 
contract dummy crosses the mean OLS estimate of the coefficient at approximately the 30th 
percentile, and thereafter lies below the mean estimate. Therefore for wage earners at all 
percentiles of violation above the 30th percentile, the magnitude of the effect of a written contract 
on the depth of violation is larger than for wage earners at the mean estimate of violation depth, 
V1. For workers at the mean of the distribution, a written contract reduces the depth of violation 
by 4.5 percentage points, whereas for workers above the 30th percentile of violation, a written 
contract can result in a reduction in V1 of between 5% and 7 %.  The coefficients of the dummy 
variable for permanent contract-holders were found to be negative and significant at all 
percentiles between the 20th and the 80th percentiles of violation. The results show that 
permanent employees at those percentiles enjoyed a depth of violation that was between 2.1% 
and 3.7% lower than their non-permanent counterparts. Interestingly, the magnitudes of the 
coefficients for the permanent dummy variable are lower than those of the written contract 
dummy. This suggests that the possession of a written contract in 2007 was more influential in 
determining the depth of violation than the duration of the contract.  
The years of tenure of an employee is clearly also an important determinant of the 
magnitude of individual violation observed. The coefficient for the log of tenure of the individual 
is significant not only at the mean but also across the length of the distribution, barring the tails. 
The size of the coefficient of the tenure variable seems to be fairly stable across the distribution, 
lying above the mean OLS estimate for the entire distribution. The coefficient is significant and 
negative for all estimated percentiles in the distribution except at the very bottom (1st percentile) 
and the top (85th percentile onwards). For those percentiles where the coefficient is significant, 
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increase in the tenure of an employee  was associated with a reduction in their depth of violation 
of between 0.5% and 2.3% in 2007.  
The results for the formal and the semiformal dummy variables indicate that the sector in 
which a firm s located is an important determinant of the depth of violation both at the mean of 
violation, as well as across the distribution. The coefficient for the formal sector dummy variable 
was significant from the 5th percentile until the median of the distribution is reached. Individuals 
in those percentiles whom were employed in formal enterprises therefore experienced a 
significantly lower depth of violation than their counterparts engaged in informal sector 
employment in 2007. The coefficient for semiformal firms is significant over the entire 
distribution, with the exception of the first 30 percentiles.  The coefficient for the semiformal 
variable is of the highest magnitude relative to the other firm-level/contractual characteristics 
investigated. Workers in Firms that were classified as semiformal enjoyed a depth of violation of 
up to 11% lower than their counterparts in firms that were neither registered for income tax or 
VAT in 2007. The magnitude of the coefficients suggests that the gap between the depth of 
violation semiformal firms and firms in the informal sector was larger than the formal-informal 
gap.  
Figure 4b below sheds light on the effect of the number of labour inspectors and the 
unemployment rate on V1 by percentile. Each variable has been plotted separately so that more 
variation may be observed.   



















A closer examination of the results for the coefficients of the inspector density variable 
reveals that the density of labour inspectors in an area is statistically significant at the mean and 
median of the distribution but not at the tails. The coefficient for the density of labour inspectors 
is statistically significant across the distribution of the depth of violation, V1, but not at the very 
bottom (5th, 10th and 15th percentiles) or at the very top (90th and 95th percentiles) of the 
distribution. This implies that for very low or very high degrees of violation, the density of labour 
inspectors does not significantly influence the depth of violation, V1. For the remaining points in 
the distribution of violated workers, the coefficients are negative and significant at the 1% level, 
barring the 80th and 85th percentiles, where the coefficients are negative and significant at the 
10% level. Hence, for these percentiles, a higher density of labour inspectors in the locality 
resulted in a significantly reduced depth of violation. For the length of the distribution where the 
inspectors variable is statistically significant, that is, between the 15th and 90th percentiles, a 1 % 
increase in the density of labour inspectors results in a  decrease in the depth of violation of 
between 1.4 and 2.5%.  
The coefficients for the unemployment rate variable are significant and positive across the 
distribution with the exception of the 95th percentile. The estimated coefficients indicate that a 
higher unemployment rate in an area results in a significantly higher depth of violation. Until the 
95th percentile is reached, all coefficients are highly significant, at the 1% level, with the exception 
of the 1st percentile coefficient, which is significant at 10 %. The size of the coefficient increases 
with percentile. For the lower percentiles, the coefficient lies below the horizontal line that 
represents the mean OLS estimate, and rises above the OLS estimate as the 20th percentile is 
approached. This indicates that the impact of the unemployment rate increases with the depth of 
violation. A 1% rise in the unemployment rate results in an increase in the depth of violation of 
between 4.4% (at the lowest percentile), to 33.7 % (at the 85th percentile).  The coefficients for 
the unemployment variable are of a magnitude much larger than for the variable measuring the 













violation in 2007. The key result here is that the coefficients for the unemployment rate in the 
regressions on the depth of violation are of the largest magnitude relative to the other variables 
(barring some sector dummies). This is a powerful result and suggests that regional or local 




































The results in this thesis are an important value-added to previous research on enforcement of 
minimum wages in developing countries, and constitute, as far as the author is aware, the first 
attempt to empirically estimate the effect of government enforcement on compliance with 
minimum wage legislation in South Africa. Analysis of the minimum wage regulatory 
environment in South Africa, as measured by the level, depth and extent of violation of 
minimum wages (violation indices V0, V1, and V2 respectively), reveals that non-compliance 
levels of employers in the country with minimum wages are disturbingly high. The results from 
the multivariate analysis showed that there are a variety of factors impacting on the probability 
and depth of violation, including individual, sectoral, firm-level/contractual, and spatial/density 
characteristics. While individual characteristics such as race and gender were significant markers 
of whether an employee was violated or not, they were shown to be insignificant in determining 
the depth of violation. The key variables that emerged throughout the multivariate analysis as the 
crucial determinants of the level and depth of violation were the intensity of enforcement, as 
measured by the number of inspectors, and the local unemployment rate. Using quantile 
regression techniques, these results were found to be significant across all quantiles of the 
distribution of violated individuals. The unemployment rate was found to exert the largest 
influence on the depth of violation. This is an important result, indicative of the extent to which 
labour market dynamics can influence compliance with minimum wage laws.  
 The results from this analysis carry important policy implications for South Africa. There 
are two decisions facing a planner setting minimum wage policy, specifically setting the minimum 
wage, and choosing the intensity of enforcement. One of the key results obtained is that the 
strength of enforcement, as measured by the number of labour inspectors, significantly reduces 
the level and depth of non-compliance.  While individual characteristics, such as race, gender, 
and age, are beyond policy control, the government can control the strength of enforcement. 













where compliance rates are the lowest. Another important implication for policy is the legislated 
wage floor. The evidence presented in this paper shows that minimum wages in South Africa are 
set very high relative to the median wage in several sectors, as well as well above the median 
wage for unskilled labour. Preliminary evidence presented here suggests a positive correlation 
between the Kaitz index (the ratio of the minimum wage to the median) and the three measures 
of violation proposed, namely V0, V1, and V2. A noteworthy example is the Security sector 
which recorded the highest measures for violation in 2007, and ironically also the highest Kaitz 
values. High minimum wages paired with lax enforcement in South Africa engender high levels 








































Farm Workers 2002 A  762.12 1,041.00 
B  724.05 989.00 
Domestic Workers 2002 A  >27 hrs 781.03 1,066.83 
<27hrs 633.66 865.54 
B >27 hrs 553.53 756.09 
<27hrs 449.06 613.39 
Private Security 2001 A  1,772.40 2,420.98 
B  1,623.60 2,217.73 
C  1,469.40 2,007.10 
D  1,368.60 1,869.41 
E  1,227.60 1,676.82 
Taxi 1999 Drivers  1,093.30 1,493.37 
Taxi fare collector/other 765.32 1,045.37 
Retail 2002 Managers A  2,861.33 3,908.38 
B  2,287.83 3,125.02 
C  2,173.44 2,968.77 
Clerks A  1,805.05 2,465.58 
B  1,457.26 1,990.52 
C  1,384.40 1,890.99 
Sales A  1,805.05 2,465.58 
B  1,457.26 1,990.52 
C  1,384.40 1,890.99 
Shop 
Assistant 
A  1,428.36 1,951.04 
B  1,151.60 1,573.01 
C  1,094.02 1,494.36 
Driver A  1,376.08 1,879.63 
B  1,091.64 1,491.11 
C  1,037.06 1,416.55 
Forklift 
operator 
A  1,296.13 1,770.43 
B  1,027.06 1,402.90 
C  975.71 1,332.76 
Security A  1,217.72 1,663.32 
B  1,159.29 1,583.51 
C  1,101.33 1,504.34 
Contract Cleaner 1999 A  1,321.95 1,805.70 
B  1,321.95 1,805.70 
C  1,056.42 1,443.00 
Forestry 2001   665.28 908.73 
Hospitality 2000 Small firms (<10 employees) 984.91 1,345.32 
Large firms (>10 employees) 1,098.04 1,499.85 
Civil Engineering 2001 A  1,583.21 2,162.55 
B  1,466.14 2,002.65 
Source: LFS 2001 and 2007, StatsSA; Own calculations.  
Notes: 1. Security workers min wage calculated as average of grade officers since not enough info in LFS to classify security workers by 
grade type. Assumed first year of employment. 




























































































 Farm Domestic Retail Security Contract Cleaners Civil engineers 
DC1 A A A E C A 
DC2 A A A E C A 
DC3 A A A E C A 
DC4 A A A D C A 
DC5 B B B E C A 
DC6 A A B E C B 
DC7 B B B E C B 
DC8 A A A E C B 
DC9 B B B B C B 
DC10 B B B E C A 
DC12 B B A E C A 
DC13 B B B E C A 
DC14 B B C E C A 
DC15 B B C E C A 
DC16 B B B E C B 
DC17 A A A B C A 
DC18 B B B C C B 
DC19 B B B E C B 
DC20 B B B E C B 
DC21 B B C D B B 
DC22 B B A E B B 
DC23 B B B E B B 
DC24 B B C E B B 
DC25 B B B D B B 
DC26 B B C E B B 
DC27 B B C E B B 
DC28 B B C D B B 
DC29 B B C D B B 
DC30 B B C E C B 
DC31 A A C E C A 
DC32 B B C E C B 
DC33 B B C E C B 
DC34 B B C E C B 
DC35 B B B E C B 
DC36 B B B E C B 
DC37 B B C E C B 
DC38 B B B E C B 
DC39 B B C E C B 
DC40 B B C B A A 
DC42 A A A A A A 
DC43 B B B E B B 
DC44 B B C E C A 
CBDC1 B B B E C B 
CBDC2 A A A E C A 
CBDC3 B B C E C B 
CBDC4 B B C E C B 
CBDC8 A A B A A A 
Cape Town A A A A A A 
Port Elizabeth A A A A A A 
Durban A A A A B A 
East Rand A A A A A A 
Johannesburg A A A A A A 














Table A3: Rank of the Index of Violation, LFS September 2001- 2007 
Sectoral Determination 2001 2007 










Managers Area A 16 16 14 15 15 14 
Managers Area B 15 15 13 16 16 15 
Managers Area C 12 12 11 10 10 9 
Clerks Area A 11 10 10 8 7 7 
Clerks Area B 10 9 9 3 5 6 
Clerks Area C 4 3 3 2 3 3 
Sales Assistant Area A 13 13 12 12 12 10 
Sales Assistant Area B 1 1 1 6 1 1 
Sales Assistant Area C 7 5 4 11 2 2 
Shop Assistant Area A 8 8 8 9 13 13 
Shop Assistant Area B 6 6 6 5 6 5 
Shop Assistant Area C 3 2 2 4 4 4 
Drivers Area A 14 14 15 14 14 16 
Drivers Area B 5 7 7 7 8 8 
Drivers Area C 2 4 5 13 11 11 
Forklift operators Area A 9 11 16 1 9 12 
Total Retail Sector 6 5 5 6 6 5 
Domestic workers             
Area A 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Area B & C 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Total Domestic Workers 2 2 2 7 7 7 
Farm Workers             
Area A 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Area B & C 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Total Farm Workers 1 1 1 2 3 4 
Forestry Workers 4 4 3 3 4 6 
Taxi workers             
Taxi operators Drivers 1 1 1 2 2 2 
Taxi operators Fare collector 2 2 2 1 1 1 







Area 1 3 4 3 1 1 1 
Area 2 4 2 2 4 4 3 
Area 3 2 3 4 5 5 5 
Area 4 1 1 1 3 3 4 
Area 5 5 5 5 2 2 2 
 Total Security workers 3 3 4 1 1 1 
Hospitality Workers             
Hospitality small firms 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Hospitality med-large firms 2 2 2 2 2 2 
 Total Hospitality  5 6 6 8 8 8 
Contract cleaners             
Area 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Area 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Area 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 
 Total Contract cleaners 7 7 7 5 5 3 














Table A4: Estimates of Kaitz Index, 2001 and 2007.  
          Sectoral Determination 
2001 2007 










Managers Area A 1.93 1 0.62 13 1.53 1 0.55 16 
Managers Area B 1.56 2 0.66 12 1.38 3 0.69 12 
Managers Area C 1.54 3 0.41 16 1.52 2 0.95 10 
Clerks Area A 1.10 7 0.88 9 0.92 5 1.05 7 
Clerks Area B 0.96 8 0.77 11 0.83 7 1.15 4 
Clerks Area C 0.93 9 1.24 5 0.81 8 1.35 2 
Sales Assistant Area A 1.12 6 0.51 14 0.93 4 0.58 14 
Sales Assistant Area B 1.34 4 4.28 1 0.88 6 1.69 1 
Sales Assistant Area C 0.92 10 0.49 15 0.79 10 0.66 13 
Shop Assistant Area A 0.89 11 0.95 8 0.78 11 0.97 9 
Shop Assistant Area B 0.76 16 1.11 6 0.68 14 1.13 5 
Shop Assistant Area C 0.83 13 1.85 3 0.65 15 1.26 3 
Drivers Area A 0.86 12 0.80 10 0.79 9 0.57 15 
Drivers Area B 0.78 15 1.04 7 0.69 13 1.01 8 
Drivers Area C 0.79 14 1.40 4 0.59 16 0.73 11 
Forklift operators Area A 1.18 5 1.89 2 0.73 12 1.08 6 
Total Retail Sector 1.03 2 1.07 5 0.92 2 0.92 5 
Domestic workers Area A 0.42 1 1.36 2 0.46 1 0.87 2 
Area B & C 0.37 2 2.00 1 0.29 2 1.15 1 
Total Domestic Workers 0.40 9 1.60 2 0.33 9 0.96 4 
Farm workers Area A 0.51 2 1.08 2 0.44 1 1.01 2 
Area B & C 0.54 1 2.14 1 0.42 2 1.22 1 
Total Farm Workers 0.53 7 1.87 1 0.43 7 1.13 2 
Forestry Workers 0.44 8 1.18 4 0.38 8 1.06 3 
Taxi operators Drivers 0.75 1 0.79 1 0.72 1 0.91 2 
Taxi operators Fare collector 0.51 2 0.41 2 0.41 2 1.13 1 







Area 1 1.39 1 1.48 3 1.17 1 1.47 1 
Area 2 1.18 3 1.51 2 1.01 2 0.97 4 
Area 3 1.02 4 1.30 4 0.84 5 0.7 5 
Area 4 1.24 2 1.98 1 0.92 3 1.35 3 
Area 5 0.97 5 1.19 5 0.86 4 1.43 2 
 Total Security workers 1.18 1 1.26 3 1.06 1 1.4 1 
Hospitality small firms 0.74 1 1.36 1 0.56 2 0.93 1 
Hospitality med-large firms 0.71 2 0.87 2 0.59 1 0.73 2 
 Total Hospitality  0.72 5 0.96 6 0.58 6 0.73 8 
Contract cleaners Area 1 0.82 2 0.94 2 0.67 1 1.04 2 
Area 2  0.83 1 1.32 1 0.67 1 1.11 1 
Area 3  0.70 3 0.70 3 0.58 2 0.72 3 
 Total Contract cleaners 0.75 4 0.81 7 0.63 5 0.91 6 
Civil engineering  0.99 3 0.26 9 0.82 3 0.22 9 
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